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Intelligence testing has had a relatively long and controversial history, beginning 
with what is generally considered the first formal measure of intelligence, the Binet-
Simon Scales (1916).  Questions regarding possible cultural bias in these measures arose 
virtually simultaneously (e.g. Burt, 1921; Stern, 1914).  Over the course of the twentieth 
and early twenty-first centuries, an abundance of intelligence measures have been 
developed, with many of them having several revisions, but the issue of test bias remains 
an important one, both in the professional literature and in the popular press (Reynolds & 
Lowe, 2009).  A current intelligence measure in use, the Differential Ability Scales, 
Second Edition (DAS-II, Elliott, 2007), is a test with growing popularity for assessment 
of children and youth, not only for its ease of use, but also for its appeal to young 
children and its nonverbal composite (among other things).  Consequently, it is essential 
that there be empirical evidence supporting the use of the DAS-II as an appropriate 
measure of cognitive abilities for children of varying backgrounds.  The test publishers 
 iv 
conducted extensive research with a representative sample during test development in an 
effort to ensure that the measure met adequate reliability and validity criteria; however, 
the issue of test bias, particularly regarding cultural or racial/ethnic groups, was not 
explicitly addressed. This issue was raised and examined with the original DAS by Keith, 
Quirk, Schartzer, and Elliott (1999), but with the significant changes made from the first 
edition to the second, there is no guaranty that the evidence from the earlier would 
necessarily apply to the latter.  The current study investigated whether the DAS-II 
demonstrates systematic construct bias toward children and youth of any of four ethnic 
groups: Black, Hispanic, Asian, and White. Multi-group confirmatory factor analysis 
using data from the DAS-II standardization sample was used to assess whether criteria 
for increasingly strict levels of invariance were met across groups.  Outcomes of this 
research contribute to an existing body of literature on test bias, as well as provide 
evidence regarding cross-group construct validity in the DAS-II.  Ultimately the results 
of this study can be used to evaluate the appropriateness of the DAS-II for clinical use 
with certain ethnic groups and will help to emphasize further the importance of exploring 
these issues with all standardized tests.   
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Introduction 
Debate and general discord have plagued the field of intelligence testing virtually 
since its inception.  Given the complicated questions regarding what constitutes 
intelligence, how it can best be measured, and whether the resulting scores are 
meaningful and equivalent across different groups, this controversy comes as no surprise.  
The initiation of the psychological testing movement is traced back to Sir Francis Galton 
and his work in the early 1800s, though the roots of modern theories of intelligence are 
grounded in the work of Alfred Binet, Victor Henri, and Théodore Simon.  Intelligence 
testing also finds its foundation in the work of these individuals, as the Binet-Simon 
Scale (Binet & Simon, 1905) is typically considered the first modern intelligence test 
(Cohen & Swerdlik, 2002).   
Originally developed in France for the purposes of identifying children who 
would require specialized education, the Binet-Simon Scale was translated, extended, and 
substantially revised for use in the United States (Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scales, 
Terman, 1916).  With these revisions and the occurrence of several coincidental events in 
history, intelligence tests were soon widely distributed in the United Stated and used for a 
variety of purposes.  Despite warnings regarding the limitations of Binet’s test and 
intelligence testing in general (Binet, 1973; Stern, 1914), these tests were often 
administered with little thought given to the appropriateness of their use.  The limitations 
of these measures, in conjunction with the lack of consideration for these limitations 
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when administering intelligence tests to minorities, account for many of the issues and 
criticisms pertaining to cultural bias in intelligence testing that still exist today.   
Critics of intelligence testing asserted that there was potential for language bias 
for minorities, due to the failure to consider the impact of English-language skills on test 
performance (Klineberg, 1935; Sánchez, 1934, as cited in Valencia & Suzuki, 2001, 
Chapter 5), in addition to broader cultural bias related to tests being oriented toward and 
around the majority group’s experiences and values (Bond, 1987; Butler-Omololu Doster 
& Lahey, 1984; Thomas, 1982).  Related to these arguments was an additional objection 
on the basis that tests measure different constructs when used with children who are not 
from the majority culture (Mercer, 1979).  The lack of inclusion of minorities in 
standardization samples was also grounds for criticism, as early measures were 
standardized with samples of only White children (e.g., Binet-Simon, 1905; Terman, 
1916; Terman & Merrill, 1937, 1960; Wechsler, 1949).  Moreover, inequitable social 
consequences associated with the administration of intelligence tests to minorities, 
particularly in schools, further fueled concerns related to test bias (e.g., González, 1974, 
1990; Sánchez, 1934, as cited in Valencia &Suzuki, 2001, Chapter 5; Chapman, 1988).  
In spite of these fervent criticisms and the apparent decline in hereditarianism 
after 1930 (Garth, 1925, 1930, as cited in Valencia & Suzuki, 2001, Chapter 1; Richards, 
1997), the period between 1930 and the mid-1950s was generally characterized by 
maintenance of the status quo regarding test bias (Valencia 1997; Valencia, 2010), 
perhaps in part due to the proliferation of group-administered intelligence measures 
(Valencia, 1997; Valencia & Aburto, 1991). The issue of test bias was relatively stagnant 
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until it was revived by Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka in 1954.  Attempting to 
avoid desegregation as ordered through the ruling of this case, Southern schools used 
intelligence tests to prevent children of color from entering “white” schools (Bersoff, 
1982, as cited in Valencia & Suzuki, 2001, Chapter 1).  With the civil rights movement 
highlighting the rights of racial/ethnic minorities at approximately the same time as this 
attempt to use intelligence measures to circumvent desegregation, there occurred 
something of a “perfect storm” that helped to rekindle the test bias debate (Valencia & 
Suzuki, 2001, Chapter 1).  Through a flurry of legislation during the late 1960s and early 
1970s, followed by the initiation of related empirical research, the issue of test bias was 
thus reopened and carried into the contemporary era.  
Two primary features of this debate were the relationships between a) curriculum 
differentiation (i.e., tracking) and group-administered intelligence tests, and b) 
overrepresentation of minority students in special education (Valencia, 1999; 2008).  
These concerns, combined with the previously mentioned objections and questions 
surrounding the interpretation of differences in group performance on intelligence 
measures (e.g., Eells, Davis, Havighurst, Herrick, & Taylor, 1951) laid the groundwork 
for an entire body of research investigating test bias (for a review see e.g., Jensen, 1980; 
Reynolds & Lowe, 2009; Valencia & Suzuki, 2001, Chapter 5).  As technological and 
methodological advances were made, the conceptualization of test bias, particularly 
cultural bias, moved in the direction of differential psychometric or statistical validity, 
and away from more subjective questions of cultural loading and test fairness.  From this 
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new perspective, test bias could be investigated psychometrically in terms of content 
validity, construct validity, and predictive validity.   
Before proceeding it is important to note that although validity and test bias are 
obviously connected, a significant distinction to make between the two is that bias 
involves comparison between two (or more) groups, while validity can apply to only one 
group (Jensen, 1980).  This observation is especially relevant when considering the “test 
bias” definitions of each type of validity, as empirical test bias can apply to any type of 
group (i.e. groups based on race/ethnicity, sex, socioeconomic status, etc.).  Generally, 
however, when one is comparing ethnic or racial groups test bias is referred to as cultural 
bias (e.g., Valencia & Suzuki, 2001, Chapter 5).  Furthermore, when comparing ethnic or 
racial groups, the comparison is typically between two groups, often with one identified 
as the “major” group and the other labeled as the “minor” group.  Jensen (1980) clarified 
these distinctions, as they are not indicative of value judgments:  
The major group can usually be thought of as (1) the larger of the two groups in 
the total population, (2) the group on which the test was primarily standardized, or 
(3) the group with the higher mean score on the test, assuming the major and 
minor groups differ in means (p. 376).     
Valencia and Suzuki (2001, Chapter 5) added an additional distinction: “The major group 
is the group that the test is believed not to be biased against” (p. 117).   
Although the measures discussed thus far are now largely outdated, contemporary 
measures of intelligence comprise the majority of the research conducted regarding 
cultural bias.  A number of reviews exist regarding this research, with many providing 
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evidence counter to many of the criticisms presented previously and concluding that 
evidence generally supports a lack of cultural bias against American, English-speaking 
racial/ethnic minority groups on cognitive measures and (e.g., Brown, Reynolds, & 
Whitaker, 1999; Jensen, 1980). These findings, however, are not without some 
limitations. Valencia and Suzuki (2001, Chapter 5) have presented a detailed review of 
this research, and for the sake of establishing some degree of background and gaining a 
general sense of the status of the literature and limitations within this research, a brief 
summary of their conclusions is provided here.    
In their conclusions, Valencia and Suzuki observed that identification of cultural 
bias appeared to be “psychometric specific,” in that the frequency of findings of bias 
(and, conversely, findings of non-bias) tended to coincide with certain types of validity 
and not others.  Although it is difficult to draw any conclusive inferences from this 
observation, the distribution of findings could potentially be an artifact of the 
methodologies used to study bias, the definitions themselves, or some other factor. 
Valencia and Suzuki also recognized a number of limitations to the current cultural bias 
literature, criticizing the lack of research with minority groups other than Black and 
Hispanic, and the lack of geographical representation in cultural bias research (only 12 of 
the 50 states were represented).  They suggested that there may be problems with the 
external validity of existing research, as most of the investigations into cultural bias were 
conducted with children in general education, despite the fact that most of the tests are 
used to evaluate children who are referred for special education.  Moreover, whereas 
most studies examined bias across racial or ethnic groups, very few controlled for or 
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addressed potential confounding issues of socioeconomic status, language dominance, 
and/or sex.  Valencia and Suzuki’s final point offered caveats for the “sweeping claims” 
of a general lack of cultural bias overall made by Jensen (1980).  They acknowledged that 
there is a lot of evidence supporting a lack of cultural bias in intelligence tests, but in 
light of the weaknesses in the literature, they asserted that broad claims of completely 
unbiased measures are premature and the possibility for cultural bias in intelligence tests 
remains an open issue (Valencia & Suzuki, 2001, Chapter 5; also, Jensen, 1980; 
Reynolds & Low, 2009).        
An additional observation that Valencia and Suzuki made is that in general, 
research into test bias appears to be on the decline, particularly when one compares the 
number of studies conducted in the 1970s and 1980s to the number conducted in the 
1990s forward.  This waning of research could be due, in part, to the “sweeping 
inferences” of non-bias presented in Jensen’s well-known work (1980).  Additional 
presumptions of non-bias may also stem from more recent efforts often made when 
norming a cognitive test to ensure adequate representation within the norming sample, as 
well as in-depth analyses into various aspects of reliability and validity during 
development and standardization.  Regardless, despite the recent decline in the popularity 
of this type of research, the importance to “press on” has not waned (Reynolds & Lowe, 
2009; Suzuki & Valencia, 1997). 
Valencia and Suzuki identified investigations into cultural bias for fourteen 
different intelligence measures, many of which have since been revised once (e.g. Elliott, 
2007; Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004) or in some cases twice (e.g., Wechsler, 1991, 2004; 
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Woodcock & Johnson, 1989; Woodcock, McGrew, & Mather, 2001). Most of these 
updated and current measures have not been evaluated for the presence of cultural bias, 
despite the likelihood of being administered with increasing frequency to diverse 
populations as globalization redefines boundaries of the world and the demographics 
within the United States evolve. The importance of evaluating cognitive measures for 
cultural bias cannot be emphasized enough.  These intelligence tests are among the most 
popular measures that psychologists administer (Stinnett, Havey, & Oehler-Stinnett, 
1994; Wilson & Reschly, 1996) and are used for purposes as diverse as determining 
eligibility for special education services, identification of an individual’s need for 
services, determination of parameters (i.e. intensity and duration) of treatment (Dowdy, 
Mays, Kamphaus, & Reynolds, 2009), political advocacy, program evaluation, and 
research (Keough, 1994).  Even the Wechsler scales, as the measures with the most test 
bias research, have more evidence investigating bias than any other measure, but this 
evidence is far from complete (Valencia & Suzuki, 2001, Chapter 5).      
A contemporary measure currently in use, the Differential Ability Scales, Second 
Edition (DAS-II, Elliott, 2007), is a relatively recent revision of the original Differential 
Ability Scales (DAS; Elliott, 1990) and is also an indirect descendant of both editions of 
the British Ability Scales (BAS; Elliott, Murray, & Pearson, 1979; BAS-II; Elliott, 1996).  
As a test with growing popularity, not only for its ease of use, but also for its appeal to 
young children and its nonverbal composite (among other things), it is essential that there 
be evidence supporting the use of the DAS-II as an appropriate measure of cognitive 
abilities for children of varying backgrounds.  In an effort to ensure that the measure met 
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adequate reliability and validity criteria, the test publishers conducted extensive research 
with an over-representative sample of minority children during test development. By 
including a greater proportion of minority participants in their sample than that found in 
the general population, the authors attempted to ensure adequate representation of these 
groups for statistical purposes; however, the issue of cultural test bias was not explicitly 
addressed.  There is some evidence for construct validity in the DAS-II (Elliott, 2007; 
Keith, Low, Reynolds, Patel, & Ridley, 2010; Keith, Reynolds, Roberts, Winter, & 
Austin, 2011), but there has not been any research to explore the possibility of cultural 
bias (i.e., determining whether the construct validity holds across cultural groups).  This 
issue was raised with the original DAS and addressed by Keith, Quirk, Schartzer, and 
Elliott (1999), but, again, it has not been examined with the newer edition.  
In order to address this issue, the current study investigated whether the DAS-II 
demonstrates systematic construct bias toward children of any of four ethnic groups: 
Black, Hispanic, White, and Asian.  Multi-group confirmatory factor analysis using data 
from the DAS-II standardization sample was used to assess whether criteria for 
increasingly strict levels of invariance are met across groups. These analyses were used to 
determine whether the DAS-II measures the same constructs across groups, and thus tests 
for construct bias across groups.  Results of this research will contribute to an existing 
body of literature on test bias, as well as provide evidence for or against the presence of 
cross-group construct validity in the DAS-II.  Ultimately the findings of this study can be 
used to evaluate the appropriateness of the DAS-II for clinical use with certain ethnic 
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groups and will help to emphasize further the importance of exploring these issues with 
all standardized tests.   
 10 
Method 
Instrumentation 
 
The Differential Ability Scales, Second Edition (DAS-II, Elliott, 2007) is an 
individually administered test of cognitive abilities for children and adolescents ages two 
years, six months (2:6) to 17:11. The test is comprised of twenty-one subtests divided 
into two overlapping batteries: the Early Years Battery for children ages 2:6 through 
6:11, and the School-Age Battery for children ages 7:0 through 17:11. Within the Early 
Years Battery is an additional level of differentiation, with a lower level for very young 
children (2:6-3:5) and an upper level for slightly older children (3:6-6:11).  All batteries 
yield an overall composite score, lower-level diagnostic “cluster” scores, and specific 
ability measures, which include both the core and diagnostic subtests.    
The DAS-II was revised from its original version in order to provide updated 
norms that were achieved using a sample that was representative of the current 
population, as well as “to address more fully some of the current trends in cognitive and 
developmental theory” (Elliott, 2007, p. 1).   In addition to the use of a new norming 
sample, notable changes from the original DAS include four new subtests: Rapid Naming 
and Phonological Processing reflect developments in research relating to dyslexia, while 
Recall of Digits Backward and Recall of Sequential Order reflect more current research 
in the area of working memory.  Intended for use with exceptional children (i.e., children 
with attention difficulties, mild verbal or language limitations, etc.) the DAS-II provides 
measures of both general nonverbal conceptual and reasoning abilities and can be used to 
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compare ability measures to a wide range of academic achievement measures.  A 
description of each subtest, based in part on information from the DAS-II technical 
manual (Elliott, 2007), is provided in Table 1.  
Table 1 
Description of the DAS-II Subtests  
Subtest Description 
 
Verbal  
  Comprehension 
 
Measure of receptive language for which child follows oral instructions 
to point to, manipulate, and select objects or pictures  
 
Naming Vocabulary 
 
Expressive language measure for which child names objects presented 
in pictures 
 
Word Definitions* 
 
Measure of knowledge of word meanings for which the child explains 
the meaning of words presented orally by the examiner 
 
Verbal Similarities* 
 
Measure of word knowledge and verbal reasoning skills on which child 
explains how three named things or concepts go together  
 
Early Number    
  Concepts 
Child answers basic quantitative questions (counting, number concepts, 
and arithmetic) presented orally with corresponding pictures 
 
Picture Similarities Nonverbal reasoning measure for which child matches pictures based 
on concrete and abstract relationships by placing response card below 
one of four pictured stimuli 
Matrices* Measure of nonverbal reasoning for which child solves visual puzzles 
by selecting image missing from a 2x2 or 3x3 matrix  
Sequential and  
  Quantitative   
  Reasoning* 
Measure of ability to detect sequential patterns for which child 
determines which image completes a sequence of pictures, numbers, or 
geometric figures  
 
Copying 
 
Measure of visual perception and motor coordination for which child 
draws a reproduction of abstract, geometric line images 
 
Matching Letter- 
  Like Forms 
 
Measure of visual perception and discrimination requiring child to 
match shape of presented figure to identical shape presented as part of a 
series of similar options  
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Table 1 (cont.) 
 
 
Pattern   
  Construction* 
 
 
 
Measure of visuo-perceptual matching, nonverbal reasoning, and 
spatial visualization for which child uses wooden blocks, plastic 
blocks, or flat tiles to recreate constructions made by examiner or to 
recreate patterns presented in pictures  
 
Recall of Designs* 
 
Measure of visuo-motor integration and short-term recall fro which 
child reproduces drawing of abstract geographic designs from memory 
after viewing drawing for 5 seconds 
Recognition of   
  Pictures* 
Measure of short-term, nonverbal visual memory for which child views 
images for a set period of time before being asked to select images 
viewed from a set of distracters 
 
Recall of Objects-    
  Immediate* 
 
Measure of short-term memory for which child is taught names of 20 
pictures immediately before being given 40-45 seconds to recall as 
many pictures as possible   
 
Recall of Objects-  
  Delayed* 
 
Measure of immediate-term memory for which, without viewing 
pictures again, child is asked to recall pictures after a 10-30 minute 
delay 
 
Recall- Digits     
  Forward* 
 
Measure of short-term, auditory memory for which child repeats 
increasingly long series of digits recited by examiner  
 
Recall- Digits  
  Backwards* 
 
Measure of short-term, auditory memory for which, in reverse order, 
child repeats increasingly long series of digits recited by examiner 
 
Recall of Sequential  
  Order* 
 
Measure of short-term recall for which child recalls, in a specified 
sequential order, increasingly long series of verbal and pictorial 
information 
 
Speed of 
  Information 
  Processing* 
 
Measure of efficiency of performing simple mental operations for 
which child marks figure with most parts in each row as quickly as 
possible  
 
Rapid Naming* 
 
Measure of efficiency of naming visual stimuli for which child names 
colors and/or images as quickly as possible without making mistakes  
 
Phonological   
  Processing 
 
Measure of awareness of and ability to manipulate phonemes in the 
English language for which child responds to verbal stimuli by 
rhyming, blending sounds, deleting sounds, and identifying phonemes 
in words 
Note. *Denotes subtests included in the current analyses 
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Development of the instrument. According to the DAS-II manual (Elliott, 
2007), development of the DAS-II was an iterative process, beginning with focus groups 
and surveys of experts and examiners during conceptual development, followed by a 
national pilot and a national tryout, standardization, and ultimately, scaling and norms 
development.  During the conceptual development phase, special emphasis was placed on 
identifying the primary goals of revision, which were determined to be, “to update the 
normative information and kit materials while maintaining the integrity and overall 
design of the instrument” (Elliott, 2007, p 101).  Later, during the national pilot and 
tryout phases, additional emphasis was placed on considering evidence of clinical utility, 
as well as bias at the item level.  Results from the national pilot and national tryout were 
used to inform the development of the standardization edition of the measure.  The Rasch 
model of item response theory was employed to analyze items and subtests and to 
develop item-scoring rules.  Moreover, data supporting reliability, validity, and clinical 
utility of the measure were also collected during the standardization phase.  
Reliability and validity of the DAS-II.  In general, evidence provided in the 
testing manual suggests that the DAS-II demonstrates at least adequate reliability, and it 
frequently meets standards of excellence (Elliott, 2007).  For the overall sample, the 
range of average reliability (internal consistency) coefficients for subtests on the Early 
Years battery was from .79 to .94.  For the School Age battery, average reliability 
coefficients ranged from .74 to .96.  Overall, these reliability estimates are improved 
from the original edition of the measure.  Across age groups, average corrected stability 
coefficients of subtest, cluster, and composite scores range from .63 (two subtests, 
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Matching Letter-Like Forms and Recognition of Pictures) to .91 (one subtest, Naming 
Vocabulary, and the General Conceptual Ability) over a retest interval of 1 to 9 weeks.  
All cluster and composite scores have corrected stability coefficients between .81 and 
.92, which are considered to be in the “excellent” range.   
As is true for reliability, the DAS-II also demonstrated strong evidence of validity 
(Elliott, 2007).  To begin, the Cattell-Horn-Carroll theory—the model of intelligence that 
informed the development of the DAS-II and the model used for the current study—is the 
model of intelligence with the most empirical support and although imperfect, is “the best 
current description of the structure of human intelligence” (Keith & Reynolds, 2010, p 8).  
With that in mind, for the overall sample and across age groups, evidence of (internal) 
convergent and discriminant validity was provided by demonstrating the expected pattern 
of correlations among subtests and composites.  Specifically, higher correlations were 
found among subtests comprising the same composite (e.g., Verbal Ability) than with 
subtests comprising other composites (e.g., Verbal with Spatial Ability).  Confirmatory 
factor analysis was also conducted in order to establish evidence for the test’s factor 
structure.  Evidence supporting a two-factor hierarchical model was established for 
children ages 2:6-3:5, a four-factor model for children ages 4:0-5:11, and a six-factor 
model for children ages 6:0-17:11.  These analyses were broken down according to the 
specified age groups due to differences in the subtests that were administered to children 
of different ages.  Independent researchers (Keith et. al., 2010) have more recently used 
additional factor analyses to demonstrate strong evidence for a six-factor model for 
children ages 4:0-17:11.  
 15 
External validity (i.e., concurrent validity) was assessed by comparing DAS-II 
scores with scores from other ability measures (Elliott, 2007).   As described in the test 
manual, several expectations were met with regard to these comparisons.   First, the 
scores of the DAS-II were moderately to strongly correlated with scores from other 
comprehensive measures of cognitive abilities, ranging from .59 with the Bayley Scales 
of Infant and Toddler Development, Third Edition (Bayley-III; Bayley, 2005) to .84 with 
the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, Fourth Edition (WISC-IV; Wechsler, 2003) 
to .88 with the original DAS.  Second, The DAS-II correlated moderately with total 
scores from various measures of academic achievement, ranging from .79 to .82 with the 
Wechsler Individual Achievement Test, Second Edition (WIAT-II; Wechsler, 2001) for a 
sample of children identified as having ADHD and LD and a non-clinical sample, 
respectively. Additional evidence supporting the validity of the DAS-II was provided 
through independent research conducted to examine sex differences on the DAS-II 
(Keith, Reynolds, Roberts, Winter, & Austin, 2011). The authors investigated construct 
bias by testing for measurement invariance as a preliminary step, with sufficient levels of 
invariance established across groups.    
Participants 
 Participants in the current study were cases selected from the DAS-II 
standardization sample.  The overall standardization sample was stratified according to 
age, sex, race/ethnicity, parent education level, and geographic region based on data 
gathered in 2005 by the US Bureau of the Census (Current Population Survey), with 
oversampling of minority ethnic groups.  The sample from which cases were drawn for 
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the current study included 2,270 children ages 5:0-17:11 from Hispanic, Black, Asian, 
and White ethnic groups.1  Sample sizes for each ethnic group are provided in Table 2. 
Because there were many more White children in the total sample, White participants 
were selected at random from the total sample to form two White sub-samples to be equal 
in size to the largest of the other sample sizes.    
Details regarding countries of origin or countries of heritage for minority children, 
particularly those of Asian and Hispanic descent, were not available.  According to the 
test manual, all children spoke English, with bilingual children included only if English 
was reported to be the primary language of the child; however, the test manual did not 
report details regarding how a child’s primary language was determined.  Additionally, 
all children were able to communicate verbally at a level consistent with their age; no 
nonverbal or uncommunicative children were included.  
Table 2 
Demographic Characteristics of Study Participants 
 
 Variable Asian Black Hispanic White 1 White 2 Total 
 N 98 407 432 432 432 1,801 
Sex Male 39 
(39.8%) 
198 
(48.6%) 
218 
(50.5%) 
228 
(52.8%) 
213 
(49.3%) 
896 
(49.8%) 
 Female 59 
(60.2%) 
209 
(51.4%) 
214 
(49.5%) 
204 
(47.2%) 
219 
(50.7%) 
905 
(50.2%) 
Age 5:0-7:11 26 
(26.5%) 
91 
(22.4%) 
114 
(26.4%) 
91 
(21.0%) 
76 
(17.6%) 
398 
(22.1%) 
 8:0-10:11 20 
(20.4%) 
95 
(23.4%) 
104 
(24.1%) 
94 
(21.7%) 
100 
(23.2%) 
413 
(22.9%) 
 11:0-13:11 21 
(21.4%) 
95 
(23.9%) 
98 
(22.6%) 
94 
(21.8%) 
112 
(26.0%) 
420 
(23.3%) 
 14:0-17:11 31 
(31.7%) 
126 
(31.1%) 
116 
(26.8%) 
153 
(35.5%) 
144 
(33.3%) 
570 
(31.6%) 
                                                
1 Group labels used are the same as those used in the DAS-II technical manual (Elliott, 2007).  
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Procedure 
  
The current study used multi-group confirmatory factor analysis (MG-CFA) to 
investigate whether the DAS-II demonstrates construct bias toward children of any of 
four ethnic groups: Asian, Black, Hispanic, and White. Assessing for construct bias—
also called measurement bias—across groups investigates whether the test measures the 
same underlying construct in the same way for all groups under consideration.  This is 
equivalent to testing for measurement invariance across groups—evaluating whether the 
measure varies in the underlying construct it measures based on group membership.  
Measurement invariance is most frequently evaluated using MG-CFA (e.g., Cheung & 
Rensvold, 2002), which “provides a more organized, direct, objective, and complete 
method for detecting construct bias than do other methods” (Keith, et. al., 1995, p. 347). 
See Appendix for a review of alternative methods for evaluating test bias.   
Analysis 
Descriptive statistics.  Correlation matrices, means, and standard deviations of 
subtest standard scores were calculated for each ethnic group using IBM SPSS Statistics, 
Version 19.0 (IBM Corp., 2010).  Covariance matrices were analyzed via SPSS Amos, 
Version 19.0 (Arbuckle, 2006) using multi-group confirmatory factor analysis.  Missing 
data was very minimal, with a total of only 8 missing individual subtest standard scores 
in the total sample of 1,801 participants (each with 13 individual subtest standard scores). 
In order to obtain modification indices through Amos, however, there cannot be any 
missing data. Thus, full-information maximum likelihood was used to obtain means, 
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variances and covariances from the raw data in order to create covariance matrices that 
were then used to conduct the analyses in Amos (e.g., Graham & Coffman, 2012).    
Data analysis.  The purpose of this research was to determine whether the DAS-
II measures the same constructs for Black, Hispanic, Asian, and White children ages 5:0 
to 17:11. In other words, by testing for construct bias or measurement invariance across 
racial/ethnic groups, the current study evaluated whether there is evidence that the DAS-
II is biased against any of these groups.  The model used for these analyses is illustrated 
in Figure 1, with subtests limited to those administered to all children within specified 
age range.  To clarify, the DAS-II includes some subtests for school-age children that are 
only administered to certain age subsets within the 5:0-17:11 range (i.e., school readiness 
measures for younger children), and thus subtests only administered to portions of the 
sample were not included in the current analyses.  As mentioned previously, multi-group 
confirmatory factor analysis was used to address this question and did so by testing 
increasingly strict levels of invariance across ethnic groups.  Group comparisons were 
conducted in a pairwise fashion, so as to compare the majority group (White) individually 
with each minority group (Black, Hispanic, and Asian), as is common in this type of 
research (e.g., Jensen, 1980).  Procedures were replicated with an additional White 
comparison sample in order to explore the reliability of initial findings.   
Each level of invariance was progressively stricter than the previous level, 
meaning that with each step of invariance testing additional equality constraints were 
imposed across groups.  Criteria for lesser degrees of invariance must be met—in other 
words, invariance across groups given fewer equality constraints must be established— 
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prior to advancing to the next level of analysis.  Generally following the process 
described by Meredith (1993), specific levels of invariance, in order of increasingly 
stringent criteria, include configural invariance, metric invariance, and intercept 
invariance.  If invariance is not present across groups at any level, and partial invariance 
cannot be established, then the test is considered biased toward that particular group.  
Due to the increasingly stringent criteria required to progress through each step of these 
analyses, the current study addressed two specific research questions: (a) Is construct bias 
present in the DAS-II? And (b) If so, where does this bias exist?  Additionally, given the 
pairwise nature of the comparisons and the need to decrease the White sample size to 
match that of the largest ethnic minority sample, a third question was addressed: (c) Can 
these findings be supported via replication with a different comparison group?  The 
following sections describe each level of invariance testing in more detail and clarify how 
these analyses addressed the above research questions.  
Configural invariance.  Generally speaking, to establish configural invariance is 
to establish that the measure’s factors have the same configuration across groups.  More 
specifically, analysis at this level assessed whether the constructs that a test measures 
have the same configuration, or pattern of factor loadings, across groups.  To do this, the 
factors and the pattern of loadings were set to be the same for all groups, but no equality 
constraints were made.  In other words, the model structure was the same for both groups, 
but the parameters estimated across models (means, intercepts, variances, etc.) were free 
to vary.  Means of all latent variables were fixed to zero, while the intercepts for the  
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Figure 1.  Factor Structure of the DAS-II 
 
Note. Error terms not shown.    
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measured variables were freely estimated for all groups.  In order to set a scale for each 
factor, one unstandardized factor loading for each factor was set to one, while the 
remaining unstandardized factor loadings were allowed to vary freely.  This method, 
called unit loading identification, was used throughout the current study because the 
alternative method for standardizing a factor— unit variance identification, which fixes 
the factor variance to 1.0— is most appropriate for use with factors in standardized form.  
For the purposes of the proposed study, analyses were conducted on factors in 
unstandardized form (for reasons which will be made clear later), making unit loading 
identification the more appropriate method.  Measures of overall model fit were 
considered before moving to the next step of the analyses.  An explanation of model fit, 
the various indicators of model fit, and the criteria used to determine good model fit are 
explained in the section following the discussion of each level of invariance testing.              
Metric invariance.  Only after meeting criteria for configural invariance was 
metric invariance (or weak factorial invariance) assessed.  This level of invariance 
testing examines whether the relation of the measured variables to the latent variables, or 
the scale of the latent variables, is the same across groups.   To do this, the 
unstandardized factor loadings—which were estimated freely in the Configural model—
were constrained to be equal to corresponding factor loadings across groups.  As in the 
first level of invariance testing, measures of overall model fit were again considered, 
although at this level comparisons of model fit were also made.  Details regarding these 
comparisons are described in the section following intercept invariance, but in short, a 
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significant decline in model fit from the Configural model to the Metric model suggests a 
lack of support for metric invariance.   As Keith and Reynolds (2012) explained, if the 
additional constraint in the Metric model is supported (i.e., model fit does not 
significantly worsen) then a one unit increase in a specific latent variable should result in 
an increase on each associated measured variable that is the same across groups.  If 
acceptable model fit cannot be achieved at the metric invariance level, partial invariance 
can be explored; however, this procedure will be described in more depth later.  
Assuming support for the presence of metric invariance, one can then conclude that the 
underlying factors are the “same” across groups (Keith & Reynolds, 2012). However, 
assessing intercept invariance is also essential, as metric invariance does not provide 
sufficient evidence to support claims of a lack of construct bias.  More specifically, one 
cannot claim (based on metric invariance) that all groups with the same levels of latent 
abilities would have the same observed scores (Keith & Reynolds, 2012).  
Intercept invariance. After criteria for metric invariance was met, intercept 
invariance (or strong factorial invariance), was assessed.  Invariance at this level of 
analysis suggests that, given equal scores on latent factors, the intercepts of the measured 
variables are the same across groups.  As described in Keith and Reynolds (2012), 
differences in intercepts—and therefore means—on measured variables are indicative of 
a systematic advantage for one group over another, as one group would display higher 
means for subtests than another group despite having equal latent abilities across groups.  
Previously, in the Metric invariance model, factor means were fixed to zero (and thus 
were set to be equal across groups), and subtest intercepts were allowed to vary freely 
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across groups.  To make the assessment associated with intercept invariance, however, 
factor means were allowed to vary across groups and all corresponding subtest intercepts 
are constrained to be equal across groups.  As Keith and Reynolds (2012) indicated, 
differences in latent (factor) means should account for the differences across groups in 
the observed test (i.e., subtest) scores. In other words, groups with the same latent (factor) 
means should achieve the same subtest scores.  These conclusions would be supported by 
the maintenance of good model fit with the addition of intercept invariance constraints.  
If good model fit is not maintained, however, the differences in latent means would be 
misleading, and potential reasons for this lack of fit should be investigated (Keith & 
Reynolds, 2012).   
 Given a significant decline in model fit at the metric or intercept invariance level, 
partial invariance can be explored.  At this level of analysis, focus was on bias related to 
specific subtests, supporting the assertion that establishing partial intercept invariance is 
akin to assessing content bias at the subtest level—as compared to content bias at the 
item level, which is commonly conducted during measurement development (e.g., Elliot, 
2007).  To assess for partial intercept invariance, modification indices were used to 
identify specific subtests that may account for the significant decrease in model fit.  The 
measured intercepts for these subtests were systematically allowed to vary across groups, 
and model fit was re-evaluated with each adjustment.  Adjustments to the model stopped 
when model fit did not degrade significantly, as this evidence suggested that partial 
metric/intercept invariance had been established.  In this way, metric/intercept invariance 
could be recognized in the areas where it was present, and any specific problematic 
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subtests could be identified as such.  It should be noted that it is possible to test for partial 
invariance at any level if complete invariance is not achieved (Keith & Reynolds, 2012); 
however, because intercept invariance is the strongest level of invariance testing 
commonly achieved, investigating partial invariance at the intercept invariance level is 
more common than at the preceding, weaker levels of testing.     
Model fit. As mentioned previously, model fit was assessed at each level of 
invariance testing, and additional model fit comparisons were made at the metric and 
intercept invariance levels.  Several fit indices are available for the purposes of evaluating 
model fit, with different fit indices incorporating varying aspects of fit.  Consequently, 
the use of several criteria to establish model fit is recommended (Hu & Bentler,1999).   
For assessing the fit of single models in the current study, the root mean square 
error of approximation (RMSEA), the comparative fit index (CFI), and the standardized 
root mean square residual (SRMR) were used (e.g., Boomsma, 2000; McDonald & Ho, 
2002).  RMSEA involves the lack of fit of the model in question compared to the 
population covariance matrix and is designed to measure approximate fit of a model per 
degree of freedom while taking sample size into account (Kline, 2005). An adjusted 
RMSEA based on the number of groups included in the analysis is recommended for use 
with multiple samples (Steiger, 1998) and was employed in the current study for group 
comparison analyses.  Supported as an acceptable measure of overall model fit (Fan, 
Thompson, & Wang, 1999), RMSEA values below .05 indicate good fit (Browne & 
Cudeck, 1993; Hu & Bentler, 1999).  Browne and Cudeck (1993) also suggested that 
values below .08 represent adequate fit, whereas values greater than .10 indicate poor fit.  
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The CFI calculates model fit based on comparisons between the model in question and 
the null, or baseline model, for which population covariances among observed variables 
are assumed to be zero (Kline, 2005).  In general, CFI values approaching 1.00 indicate 
better fit, with values over .95 suggesting good fit, and values over .90 representing 
reasonable fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999).  The SRMR represents the “average difference 
between the actual correlations among measured variables and those predicted by the 
model” (Keith, 2006, p. 270).  Identified as one of the best measures of model fit, SRMR 
values below approximately .08 indicate good model fit (Hu & Bentler, 1998, 1999).  
Model fit comparisons are necessary to determine whether the additional 
constraints or restrictions imposed at each level of invariance testing significantly 
degrade the fit of the model to the data.  Determining the degree of invariance between 
two nested models is often assessed using the Likelihood Ratio Test—the difference in 
chi-square between two models (∆χ2; Cheung & Rensvold, 2002).  However, evidence 
suggests that the χ2 statistic is highly sensitive to sample size (e.g., Brannick, 1995; 
Kelloway, 1995) and that it may not be a practically useful measure for determining 
overall model fit or for comparing competing models when testing for invariance (e.g., 
Cheung & Rensvold, 2002). Several other fit indices have been proposed as practical 
alternative measures for overall fit, such as those mentioned above and used for the 
purposes of the current study, as well as alternative methods for comparing competing 
models.  Based on simulation research, Cheung and Rensvold (2002) suggested the use of 
the CFI difference across models (across each level of invariance: ΔCFI). Strengths of 
both CFI and ΔCFI are that neither is affected by sample size, they are not significantly 
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correlated with each other, and neither is affected by model complexity (Cheung & 
Rensvold, 2002). This criteria has become common in CFA invariance studies (e.g., 
Weiss, Keith, Zhu, & Chen, 2013). The critical value for ∆CFI is -0.01, meaning that a 
decrease in CFI of greater than 0.01 across models suggests a lack of invariance across 
groups at that level and that bias in some form may be present.  
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Results 
 
Initial Analyses 
Initial models were analyzed with each individual sample prior to making any 
comparisons across groups in order to evaluate overall model fit with each individual 
sample. Subtest means and standard deviations for each sample are included in Table 3.  
The goodness-of-fit indices resulting from these analyses are included in Table 4 and 
support adequate to good model fit for all samples.  With CFI values equal to or greater 
than .95 indicating good model fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999), results of these preliminary 
analyses (with a minimum CFI value of .97) suggest good model fit across all individual 
samples. Values for RMSEA below .05 indicate good fit, whereas values less than .08 
indicate adequate fit (Browne & Cudeck, 1993; Hu & Bentler, 1999).  Given these 
criteria, the RMSEA values for the Asian, Hispanic and both White samples suggest good 
fit, and for the Black sample (RMSEA=.053) suggests adequate to good fit. It should be 
noted that multi-sample adjustments in RMSEA were not made for these initial analyses, 
as there was only one sample analyzed at a time. Lastly, SRMR values below .08 suggest 
good model fit, and with SRMR values across all samples having values less than .062, 
further evidence was provided for good model fit. Based on these results, it was 
appropriate to move forward with the analyses without modifying the model in any way 
for any group.      
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Table 3 
 
Group Subtest Means and Standard Deviations 
 
 Asian Black Hispanic White 1 White 2 
Subtest 
 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Word 
   Definition 
53.00 9.55 46.39 9.00 47.06 8.73 51.30 9.60 51.49 9.92 
Verbal  
   Similarities 
52.88 8.85 46.82 10.18 46.51 9.84 52.09 8.43 51.78 9.38 
Matrices 
 
56.68 10.58 46.60 10.47 48.30 8.97 51.29 9.75 50.93 9.80 
Seq & Quant  
   Reasoning 
56.62 11.26 45.79 9.07 48.22 8.95 51.21 9.36 51.38 10.35 
Pattern      
 Construction 
55.73 9.98 43.85 10.08 49.56 9.69 52.30 9.83 52.32 
 
10.93 
Recall of  
   Designs 
54.39 7.90 45.63 9.82 48.92 9.37 51.26 9.57 50.92 9.70 
Recall of Obj  
   Delayed 
52.22 8.44 47.23 10.15 49.63 9.47 50.17 9.45 50.52 10.22 
Recall of Obj  
   Immediate 
50.12 10.10 45.78 11.86 47.66 10.64 50.15 
 
10.20 49.66 10.99 
Digits  
   Forward 
55.32 13.04 49.65 10.42 46.70 10.16 50.48 11.19 49.98 10.96 
Digits  
   Backward 
54.48 10.12 46.43 10.52 48.21 9.64 51.02 8.99 49.89 9.55 
Recall of Seq  
   Order 
52.22 8.61 46.46 10.19 46.71 10.03 51.68 9.45 50.63 10.07 
Speed of Info  
   Processing 
53.73 9.10 50.39 11.50 49.10 9.43 49.85 10.06 50.84 10.06 
Rapid  
   Naming 
52.64 9.02 48.24 10.58 48.44 9.03 50.94 9.52 50.36 10.70 
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Table 4  
Model Fit For Individual Samples. 
Group CFI RMSEA SRMR 
Asian .992 .027 .0614 
Black .971 .053 .0406 
Hispanic .980 .042 .0299 
White 1 .976 .047 .0334 
White 2 .991 .032 .0247 
Data Analysis. 
Asian.  Initial comparisons: Asian-White 1.  Step 1: Configural invariance. As 
discussed previously, to examine configural invariance—to assess whether the measure’s 
factors have the same configuration across groups—the factors and the pattern of 
loadings (both free and fixed) were set to be the same for both groups being compared.  
Means of all latent variables were fixed to zero, while the intercepts for the measured 
variables were freely estimated for all groups. Measures of model fit, presented in Table 
5, were examined before moving to the next level of invariance testing.  Results of the 
initial comparison between the Asian group and White (1) group examining configural 
invariance suggest excellent model fit, with CFI and TLI values above the .95 cutoff 
(.979 and .967, respectively), an adjusted RMSEA value below .05 (RMSEAadj=.044), 
and a SRMR value well below .08 (SRMR=.0334).  This finding suggests that the factor 
model appears to be a good fit across both groups and that the factor configuration is 
similar for both groups.  
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Step 2: Metric invariance (weak factorial invariance). To assess for metric 
invariance, unstandardized factor loadings were constrained to be equal to corresponding 
factor loadings across both groups.  As in the first level of invariance testing, measures of 
model fit were again considered, although at this level comparisons of model fit were 
also made. These measures of model fit, presented in Table 5, again suggested excellent 
fit between the model and the data: CFI and TLI values were both above the .95 cutoff 
for good fit (.971 and .958, respectively), the adjusted RMSEA was below .05 
(RMSEAadj=.049), and the SRMR (.0369) was well below the .08 cutoff. Although these 
values suggested a general decline in model fit as compared to those values associated 
with configural invariance, they are all still within the range of good fit. As mentioned 
previously, to determine whether there was a significant decline in model fit, the ΔCFI 
was considered, with a ΔCFI value greater than -0.01 indicating a significant decline in 
model fit between the previous level of invariance and the current level of invariance 
being considered (with additional equality constraints established). Additional constraints 
imposed to assess metric invariance between the Asian group and the White 1 sample 
resulted in a ΔCFI of -0.008, which is below the -0.01 cutoff and suggests that model fit 
did not significantly decline and provides support for adequate metric invariance between 
these two groups. In other words, it appears that the scale— or the relationship between 
the factors and the subtests—is the same for both groups. Having established metric 
invariance, intercept invariance could then be considered.  
 Step 3: Intercept invariance (strong factorial invariance). In order to determine 
whether there appears to be intercept invariance across these groups, factor means were 
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allowed to vary across groups and all corresponding subtest intercepts were constrained 
to be equal across groups.  Overall model fit was again considered. With a CFI value 
above the .95 cutoff for good fit (CFI=.962), a TLI value above the .90 cutoff for 
adequate fit (TLI= .948), an adjusted RMSEA below the .08 cutoff for adequate fit 
(RMSEAadj=.055), and SRMR below .08 (SRMR=.0387), overall model fit was still 
adequate to good. Additionally, the ΔCFI was below the -0.01 cutoff, suggesting a non-
significant decline in model fit.  These findings provide support for the presence of 
intercept invariance between the Asian and White 1 samples, which suggests that 
differences in latent (factor) means appear to account adequately for all mean differences 
on subtest scores. 
Replication comparisons: Asian-White 2.  The same steps as those described 
above and in the previous section were followed for all remaining analyses. In order to 
avoid redundancy, details regarding each step of analysis are only included if they deviate 
from those described previously.    
Step 1: Configural invariance. Results of the comparison between the Asian 
group and White (2) group examining configural invariance suggest excellent model fit, 
with CFI and TLI values above the .95 cutoff (.991 and .986, respectively), an adjusted 
RMSEA value below .05 (RMSEAadj=.031), and a SRMR value well below .08 
(SRMR=.0247).  These findings suggests that the factor model appears to be a good fit 
across both the Asian and White 2 groups and that the factor configuration is similar for 
both groups.  Given the consistency of these results to those found between the Asian 
sample and the initial comparison group (White 1), there appears to be further support for 
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the presence of similar factor configuration for the Asian minor group as compared to the 
White major group.  
Step 2: Metric invariance (weak factorial invariance).  Measures of model fit at 
the metric invariance level across the Asian and White 2 groups, presented in Table 5, 
again suggest excellent fit between the model and the data: CFI and TLI values were both 
above the .95 cutoff for good fit (.987 and .982, respectively), the adjusted RMSEA was 
below .05 (RMSEAadj=.037), and the SRMR was well below the .08 cutoff 
(SRMR=.0261).  Regarding the comparisons between configural invariance and metric 
invariance, there was not a significant decline in model fit (ΔCFI=-.005, cutoff=-.01), 
which suggests that there is evidence for metric invariance across the Asian and White 2 
groups. In other words, it appears that the test measures the same constructs for both 
groups.  As with the replication of configural invariance between these groups, these 
results at the metric invariance level between the Asian and White 2 samples are also 
consistent with initial results between the Asian and White 1 samples, providing further 
evidence for the presence of metric invariance on the DAS-II for these groups.  
Step 3: Intercept invariance (strong factorial invariance).  Intercept invariance 
between the Asian and White 2 samples was also evaluated. With CFI and TLI values 
above the .95 cutoff for good fit (.962 and .977, respectively), an adjusted RMSEA below 
.05 (RMSEAadj=.041), and SRMR below .08 (SRMR=.0266), overall model fit was 
excellent. Additionally, the ΔCFI was below the -.01 cutoff (ΔCFI=-.004), suggesting a 
non-significant decline in model fit.  These findings support the presence of intercept 
invariance between the Asian and White 2 samples.  Again, given their similarity with the 
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findings from the comparisons between the Asian and White 1 samples, the findings 
provide further support for the presence of intercept invariance across these groups.  
Black.  As with the replication process for the Asian sample, the same steps as 
those described above and in the previous section were followed for all remaining 
analyses. In order to avoid redundancy, details regarding each step of analysis will only 
be included if they differ in any way from those described previously.  Measures of 
model fit and comparison values for all analyses are included in Table 5.   
Initial comparisons: Black- White 1.  Step 1: Configural invariance. Results of 
the initial comparison between the Black group and White (1) group examining 
configural invariance suggested excellent model fit, with CFI and TLI values above the 
.95 cutoff (.974 and .959, respectively), an adjusted RMSEA value below .05 
(RMSEAadj=.049, and a SRMR value well below .08 (SRMR=.0334).  Thus, the factor 
model appears to be a good fit across both groups and the factor configuration appears to 
be similar for both groups.  
Step 2: Metric invariance (weak factorial invariance). Overall measures of model 
fit at the metric invariance level also suggest good fit between the model and the data: 
CFI and TLI values were both above the .95 cutoff for good fit (.967 and .952, 
respectively), the adjusted RMSEA was below .08 (RMSEAadj=.054), and the SRMR was 
well below the .08 cutoff (SRMR=.0419). Although these values suggest a general 
decline in model fit as compared to those values associated with configural invariance, 
they were all still well within the range of good fit. Additional constraints imposed to 
assess metric invariance between the Black group and the White 1 sample resulted in a 
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ΔCFI of -.009, which is below the -.01 cutoff and suggests that model fit did not 
significantly decline and provides support for adequate metric invariance between these 
two groups.  
 Step 3: Intercept invariance (strong factorial invariance).  Regarding intercept 
invariance between the Black and White 1 groups, model fit was in the adequate to good 
range with a CFI value above the .95 cutoff for good fit (CFI=.956), a TLI value above 
the .90 cutoff for adequate fit (TLI= .939), an adjusted RMSEA below the .08 cutoff for 
adequate fit (RMSEAadj=.061), and SRMR below .08 (SRMR=.0387).  The ΔCFI at this 
level across the Black and White 1, however, was just over the -.01 cutoff with a ΔCFI 
value of -.011, suggesting a significant decline in model fit and evidence for potential 
bias at this level.   
Consequently, further investigation into these differences was made, and partial 
intercept invariance was explored.  Based on the modification indices provided, the 
equality constraint across groups for the intercept of the Digits Forward subtest appeared 
to be most problematic; thus, analyses were run again with intercepts for this single 
subtest allowed to vary freely across groups. Observed means on the Digits Forward 
subtest were 50.48 for the White 1 group and 49.65 for the Black group, with a difference 
in means of .83. Intercept estimates for Digits Forward were 54.223 for the Black group 
and 50.481 for the White 1 group.  Measures of overall model fit with this adjustment for 
partial intercept invariance were slightly better than those achieved with full intercept 
invariance, with a CFI of .963 (above the .95 cutoff for good model fit), a TLI of .948 
(above the .90 cutoff for adequate model fit and approaching the .95 cutoff for good fit), 
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adjusted RMSEA of .057 (below the .08 cutoff for good to adequate fit), and a SRMR of 
.0382 (well below the .08 cutoff for good fit).  The ΔCFI from the metric invariance 
model to the partial intercept invariance model was -.007, which is below the -.01 critical 
value and suggests that model fit did not significantly decline with partial intercept 
invariance with the Digits Forward subtest allowed to vary.  These findings support the 
presence of partial intercept invariance between the Black and White 1 groups, meaning 
that the Digits Forward subtest may show differences across groups that are not 
accounted for by differences in the latent Gsm (working memory) factor. The remaining 
subtests appear to have adequate intercept invariance across groups.   
Replication comparisons: Black- White 2.  Step 1: Configural invariance.  
Results of the comparison between the Black group and White (2) group examining 
configural invariance suggest excellent model fit, as CFI and TLI values were above the 
.95 cutoff (.982 and .973, respectively), the adjusted RMSEA was below .05 
(RMSEAadj=.044), and the SRMR was well below .08 (SRMR=.0247).  These findings 
suggests that the factor model appears to be a good fit across the Black and White 2 
groups and that the factor configuration is similar for both groups.  Given the consistency 
of these results to those found between the Black sample and the initial comparison group 
(White 1), there appears to be further support for the presence of similar factor 
configuration for the Black minor group as compared to the White major group on the 
DAS-II.  
Step 2: Metric invariance (weak factorial invariance).  Measures of model fit at 
the metric invariance level across the Black and White 2 groups also suggest excellent fit 
 36 
between the model and the data.  CFI and TLI values were both above the .95 cutoff for 
good fit (.982 and .973, respectively), the adjusted RMSEA was below .05 
(RMSEAadj=.047), and the SRMR value was well below the .08 cutoff (SRMR=.0247).  
Regarding the comparisons between configural invariance and metric invariance, there 
was not a significant decline in model fit (ΔCFI=-.004, cutoff=-.01), which suggests that 
there is evidence for metric invariance across the Black and White 2 groups. As with the 
replication of configural invariance between these groups, these results at the metric 
invariance level between the Black and White 2 samples are also consistent with initial 
results between the Black and White 1 samples, providing further evidence for the 
presence of metric invariance on the DAS-II across these groups.  
Step 3: Intercept invariance (strong factorial invariance).  Regarding intercept 
invariance between the Black and White 2 samples, overall model fit was good.  With 
CFI and TLI values above the .95 cutoff for good fit (.972 and .961, respectively), an 
adjusted RMSEA below .08 and approaching the .05 cutoff (RMSEAadj=.051), and a 
SRMR below .08 (SRMR=.0306), model fit for these groups at this level is better than 
model fit for the Black and White 1 groups at this level. Additionally, the ΔCFI was 
below the -.01 cutoff (ΔCFI=-.006), suggesting a non-significant decline in model fit.  
These findings support the presence of intercept invariance between the Black and White 
2 samples.     
Hispanic.  Initial comparisons: Hispanic-White 1.  Step 1: Configural 
invariance. The initial comparison between the Hispanic group and White (1) group 
examining configural invariance suggest excellent model fit, with CFI and TLI values 
 37 
above the .95 cutoff (.978 and .966, respectively), an adjusted RMSEA value below .05 
(RMSEAadj=.045), and a SRMR value well below .08 (SRMR=.0334).  Thus, the factor 
model appears to be a good fit across both groups and the factor configuration appears to 
be similar for both groups.  
Step 2: Metric invariance (weak factorial invariance).  Measures of overall model 
fit suggest excellent fit between the model and the data for the Hispanic and White 1 
groups at the metric invariance level as well: CFI and TLI values were both above the .95 
cutoff for good fit (.976 and .964, respectively), the adjusted RMSEA was below .05 
(RMSEAadj=.045), and the SRMR was well below the .08 cutoff (SRMR=.0364). 
Additional constraints imposed to assess metric invariance between the Hispanic group 
and the White 1 sample resulted in a ΔCFI of -.002, which is below the -.01 cutoff and 
suggests that model fit did not significantly decline and provides support for adequate 
metric invariance between these two groups.  
 Step 3: Intercept invariance (strong factorial invariance).  At the level of 
intercept invariance, overall model fit remained good, with CFI and TLI values above the 
.95 cutoff for good fit (CFI=.972, TLI=.961), an adjusted RMSEA below .05 
(RMSEAadj=.048), and SRMR below .08 (SRMR=.0366). Additionally, the ΔCFI was 
below the -.01 cutoff (ΔCFI =-.004), suggesting a non-significant decline in model fit.  
These findings provide support for the presence of intercept invariance between the 
Hispanic and White 1 samples.       
Replication comparisons: Hispanic-White 2.  Step 1: Configural invariance.  
Regarding the comparison between the Hispanic group and White (2) group at the 
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configural invariance level, overall measures of model fit suggest excellent model fit, 
with CFI and TLI values above the .95 cutoff (.986 and .979, respectively), an adjusted 
RMSEA value well below .05 (RMSEAadj=.038), and a SRMR value well below .08 
(SRMR=.0247).  These findings suggests that the factor model appears to be a good fit 
across both the Hispanic and White 2 groups and that the factor configuration is similar 
for both groups.  Given the consistency of these results to those found between the 
Hispanic sample and the initial comparison group (White 1), there appears to be further 
support for the presence of similar factor configuration for the Hispanic minor group as 
compared to the White major group.  
Step 2: Metric invariance (weak factorial invariance).  Overall measures of model 
fit at the metric invariance level across the Hispanic and White 2 groups, again suggest 
excellent fit between the model and the data: CFI and TLI values were both above the .95 
cutoff for good fit (.986 and .980, respectively), the adjusted RMSEA was below .05 
(RMSEAadj=.037), and the SRMR was well below the .08 cutoff (SRMR=.0254).  
Regarding the comparisons between configural invariance and metric invariance, there 
was not a significant decline in model fit (ΔCFI=-.000, cutoff=-.01), which suggests that 
there is evidence for metric invariance across the Hispanic and White 2 groups.  As with 
the replication of configural invariance between these groups, these results at the metric 
invariance level between the Hispanic and White 2 samples are also consistent with 
initial results between the Hispanic and White 1 samples, providing further evidence for 
the presence of metric invariance on the DAS-II for these groups.  
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Step 3: Intercept invariance (strong factorial invariance).  With CFI and TLI 
values above the .95 cutoff for good fit (.984 and .978, respectively), an adjusted 
RMSEA value below .05 (RMSEAadj=.038), and SRMR value below .08 (SRMR=.0258), 
overall model fit for the intercept invariance model for the Hispanic and White 2 samples 
was excellent. Additionally, the ΔCFI was below the -.01 cutoff (ΔCFI=-.002), which is 
indicative of a non-significant decline in model fit.  These findings support the presence 
of intercept invariance between the Hispanic and White 2 samples.  Again, given their 
similarity with the findings from the comparisons between the Hispanic and White 1 
samples, the findings provide further support for the presence of intercept invariance 
across these groups on the DAS-II.  
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Table 5 
 
Summary of Fit Indices for MG-CFA Analyses 
 
Groups Invariance  
    Level 
CFI ΔCFI TLI RMSEA SRMR 
Asian- White1 Configural .979  .967 .044 
 
.0334 
 Metric .971 .008 .958 .049 
 
.0369 
 Intercept .962 .009 .948 .055 
 
.0387 
       
Asian- White2 Configural .991  .986 .031 
 
.0247 
 Metric .987 .005 .982 .037 
 
.0261 
 Intercept .983 .004 .977 .041 
 
.0266 
       
Black- White 1 Configural .974  .959 .049 
 
.0334 
 Metric .967 .009 .952 .054 
 
.0364 
 Intercept .956 .011* .939 .061 
 
.0419 
 Partial-   
    Intercept 
.963 .007 .948 .057 
 
 
.0382 
       Black- White 2 Configural .982  .973 .044 
 
.0247 
 Metric .978 .004 .968 .047 
 
.0270 
 Intercept .972 .006 .961 .051 
 
.0306 
       
Hispanic-White 1 Configural .978  .966 .045 
 
.0334 
 Metric .976 .002 .964 .045 
 
.0364 
 
 
Intercept .972 .004 .961 .048 
 
 
.0366 
       
Hispanic-White 2 Configural .986  .979 .038 
 
.0247 
 Metric .986 .000 .980 .037 
 
.0254 
 Intercept .984 .002 .978 .038 
 
 
.0258 
 Note. *Denotes significant change in model fit 
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Discussion 
The DAS-II (Elliott, 2007) is a relatively new, individually administered test of 
cognitive abilities with growing popularity.  Consequently, it is essential that there be 
empirical evidence supporting the use of the DAS-II as an appropriate measure of 
cognitive abilities for children of varying backgrounds.  In an effort to ensure that the 
measure met adequate reliability and validity criteria, the test publishers conducted 
extensive research with a representative sample during test development; however, the 
issue of test bias across racial/ethnic groups was not specifically explored. The original 
DAS has been evaluated for test bias across racial/ethnic groups (Keith, Quirk, Schartzer, 
and Elliott, 1999), but there were significant changes made from the original version to 
the second edition, and thus there is no guarantee that the evidence from the original 
would necessarily apply to the newer edition.   
The purpose of the current study was to investigate whether the DAS-II 
demonstrates systematic construct bias toward children of any of the following 
racial/ethnic groups: Asian, Black, Hispanic, and White. More specifically, the current 
study aimed to address three primary research questions: (a) Is construct bias present in 
the DAS-II toward any of these groups? (b) If so, where does this bias exist? and (c) Can 
these findings be replicated with a second comparison group? In order to fulfill this 
purpose, multi-group confirmatory factor analysis was used to test for measurement 
invariance (or construct bias) across groups using data from the DAS-II standardization 
sample.  This methodology incrementally tested whether criteria for increasingly strict 
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levels of invariance were met across groups (e.g., Keith & Reynolds, 2012; Meredith, 
1993).  
Overall, the results of these analyses provide strong support for construct validity 
and a lack of construct bias for Asian and Hispanic children and youth, as compared to 
White children and youth.  In other words, the underlying attributes and constructs 
measured by the DAS-II appear to be similar, or at least not statistically discernible, 
across these groups.  Results from the current study regarding Black children and youth, 
however, are somewhat less clear due to somewhat inconsistent findings between the 
initial comparison group (White 1) and the replication sample (White 2).   
When the Black group was compared to the White 1 group at the configural and 
metric invariance levels, results supported the presence of both across groups, suggesting 
that the configuration of subtests and factors is consistent across groups, and the scale for 
the measure is consistent across groups.  It appeared, however, that full intercept 
invariance might not be tenable due to a decrease in model fit that was slightly greater 
than the cutoff value (ΔCFI > .01). Thus, partial intercept invariance was explored and 
established across these two groups by allowing the intercept of the Digits Forward 
subtest to vary across groups.  The significant improvement in model fit associated with 
this change suggests that there may be evidence of bias associated with this subtest.  In 
other words, it is possible that the Digits Forward subtest is differentially more difficult 
for one group over another, even when controlling for latent short-term memory abilities.   
If confirmed, these findings could have problematic implications for two reasons. 
First, the subtest shows higher intercept scores for one group (Black) when those same 
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differences do not exist on the underlying factor or ability.  This inconsistency may be 
indicative of a problem with the subtest and may suggest a need for caution when 
interpreting results on this subtest, as the subtest may not accurately reflect abilities for 
these children (i.e., it could potentially over-estimate scores for Black children).  Second, 
problems with intercept invariance may also result in non-valid group differences on 
composite scores that are created using the subtest in question. The Digits Forward 
subtest is a diagnostic subtest and contributes only to the diagnostic cluster for working 
memory, which suggests that this cluster score may also require interpretation with 
caution when used with Black children and youth. It should be noted that the Digits 
Forward subtest is not used in the calculation of the (overall) general cognitive ability 
score for the DAS-II, and thus this composite is not affected by these findings.     
 Despite these important considerations, these findings should be interpreted with 
caution for several reasons. To begin, there does not appear to be an apparent cultural or 
environmental explanation available for these findings.  Moreover, these results were not 
consistent with findings from comparisons with the replication sample. When compared 
to the White 2 group, the Black group was statistically indistinguishable at any level of 
invariance, thus providing good support for measurement invariance or a lack of 
construct bias across these groups. In fact, given that the comparisons between the Black 
and the initial White (1) groups maintained adequate to good model fit across all models 
and experienced a change in model fit at the intercept invariance level right at the cusp of 
significance (.01 cutoff vs .011 value), and considering the excellent model fit and 
support for measurement invariance across the Black and White 2 groups, it appears that 
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there is still adequate evidence for a lack of construct bias across these groups.  In short, 
although the findings are not as robust as with the other groups, it appears to be a 
reasonable conclusion that the DAS-II is not likely biased in favor of or against Black 
children and youth. Thus, to summarize, the results of the current study suggest that the 
subtests from the DAS-II included in the current study do not appear to show evidence of 
construct bias across any of the groups included in the current study.     
Limitations 
Despite the general conclusion that there does not appear to be evidence of 
construct bias on the DAS-II across the groups in the current study, there are several 
considerations that need to be made in order to best understand the meaning of these 
findings in a greater context.   For one, limitations in the current study related to the 
measure itself as well as the methodology are important to acknowledge and address 
through future research.  First, pertaining to the measure itself, the current study included 
only those subtests administered to all children in the school-age sample.  Further 
investigation into test bias with the DAS-II should consider the remaining school age 
subtests as well as subtests comprising the younger age battery in order to ensure that the 
evidence for a lack of construct bias also applies to these subtests and age groups.  Also, 
given the hierarchical organization of the subsets of validity (as discussed in Appendix) 
and that there has been investigation into content bias at the item level (Elliott, 2007) and 
now construct bias (current study), predictive bias for the DAS-II will be important to 
examine as well.  There is some preliminary evidence for predictive validity of the DAS-
II (Elliott, 2007); however, whether there is consistent predictive validity across 
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racial/ethnic groups (predictive bias) has not yet been explored.  Additionally, although 
the ability to assess the reliability of the findings by replicating the initial analyses with a 
second comparison group can be considered a strength of the current study, the results of 
this validation process would be strengthened further had new minor group samples been 
incorporated in addition to the major group comparison sample.  Conducting future 
research that addresses these issues would further bolster evidence for the absence of bias 
in the DAS-II across groups.   
It is also important to acknowledge the limitations regarding the generalizability 
of these results.  For one, the generalizability of these results may be limited due to 
factors related to the data available and the demographics of the participants. The samples 
used for the current study were obtained from the overall standardization sample for the 
measure, which was stratified based on the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population 
Survey from 2005.  Needless to say, the demographics of the United States have changed 
significantly since that time, which suggests that the sample may no longer be 
representative in the way it was previously. Moreover, the lack of details in the manual 
regarding the country of heritage is problematic, as labels such as “Asian” or “Hispanic” 
(those used in the DAS-II technical manual and used to determine group membership) 
typically include individuals with backgrounds from a number of countries with diverse 
histories, cultures, and languages, etc. which would imply limited generalizability of 
results that do not include representative subsamples from each country.  Similarly, there 
is tremendous cultural variability across states in the US, and given the lack of details 
regarding representation by state in the standardization sample, one cannot be entirely 
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confident that the findings of the current study are applicable across all states in the US.  
A further problem exists regarding the lack of details pertaining to methods used to 
determine language dominance in the DAS-II technical manual (Elliott, 2007), as well as 
the lack of details regarding proficiency levels in English for participants.  One cannot be 
sure that all children who participated in the standardization of the measure are in fact 
English dominant or proficient in English to a certain identifiable degree.  
Additionally, only four broad racial/ethnic groups were included in the current 
study.  Although it is somewhat unusual in studies using standardization data to have an 
Asian sample large enough to include in test bias analyses (what might be considered a 
strength of the current study as compared to the test bias literature overall- see Valencia 
& Suzuki, 2001, Chapter 5), the current study did not include additional racial/ethnic 
groups such as Native American or Pacific Islander.  It follows then that the evidence of 
non-bias in the current study may not necessarily apply to other racial or ethnic groups 
that were not included in the study. These limitations not only contribute to potentially 
limited generalizability of the results of the current study, but also represent ways in 
which standards for research in the domain of test bias should be raised. As an aside, they 
additionally pertain to test developers as important considerations to be made during the 
process of identifying participants to include as part of the standardization samples used 
to norm assessment measures.   
This point leads to recognition of further limitations for the current study and test 
bias research as a whole. For example, considerations such as how racial/ethnic groups 
are defined or whether racial/ethnic categories should be used as explanatory constructs 
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at all (e.g., Helms, Jernigan, & Mascher, 2005) are bigger, more conceptual questions that 
are directly related to this type of research. Additionally, although the current study 
provides evidence that the DAS-II measures the same underlying constructs (that has a 
statistically similar configuration, scale, and equivalent starting levels given the same 
latent abilities) across groups, the current study does not address whether this underlying 
construct does, in fact, represent a “true” or an unbiased definition of intelligence or 
cognitive abilities.  
Implications  
Outcomes of this research serve to support the general appropriateness of the 
DAS-II for clinical use with several racial/ethnic groups.  Psychologists and those 
administering and interpreting scores from this measure can feel reasonably confident 
that the construct measured by the DAS-II is likely equivalent for the ethnic/racial groups 
considered in the current study. They can also feel reasonably confident that results from 
the DAS-II, when obtained through a standard administration and considered in 
conjunction with relevant data from other sources, can provide useful information 
regarding the cognitive performance of children and youth.  As with all cognitive 
measures, however, it is important to recognize that a single number does not capture the 
full range of a person’s abilities, but rather represents an approximation of that person’s 
performance on a specific task in a certain context.   
A continued word of caution regarding the interpretation of cognitive test results 
pertains to the significance and implications of group mean differences on these 
measures, which is a noteworthy source of controversy that continues to fuel the test bias 
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debate.  This consideration is particularly relevant under circumstances similar to those in 
the current investigation—where evidence suggests a lack of construct bias in the 
measure across racial/ethnic groups—as some may misinterpret the significance or 
implications of mean score differences on a “non-biased” measure.  The meaning of 
group mean differences on this measure is limited for one by the factors identified in the 
previous section.  Second, for example, some elect to interpret group mean differences on 
“unbiased” cognitive measures as evidence for genetically inferior intellect of those 
groups scoring lower on these measure (see e.g., Appendix); however, this perspective is 
largely considered to be rooted in pseudoscience and fails to consider several alternative 
explanations for group differences, such as opportunity to learn, language, socioeconomic 
status, and segregated schools (e.g., Valencia, Rankin, & Livingston, 1995; Valencia, 
2010; Valencia, 2013). Although a more detailed discussion of these issues is beyond the 
scope of the current study, these points serve to support the need to a) consider results 
from the current investigation in a greater context, b) conduct further research in the area 
of test bias, and c) reconsider the methods and standards used to conduct test bias 
research. 
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Appendix: Literature Review  
 
 The following literature review begins with an overview of intelligence testing, 
including a brief history of its development and application, a discussion of the uses of 
intelligence tests, and a brief discussion of some of the issues associated with intelligence 
testing.  As will become evident in this overview, bias in intelligence testing is both a 
controversial topic and an imperative issue to be addressed.  A discussion of bias in 
intelligence testing follows, with an exploration into what is not meant by bias, what is 
meant by bias, and how bias can be and has been measured.  This section concludes with 
a brief review of recent research investigating bias in the testing literature.   
Overview 
Historical development.  Before one is able to fully understand the current issues 
surrounding intelligence testing, particularly the issue of test bias, one must first consider 
the historical context and development within the field of intelligence testing.  Although 
questions regarding mental ability and how to measure it have been asked all over the 
world for hundreds of years (e.g., Cohen & Swerdlik, 2002), our contemporary model of 
intelligence assessment is generally considered to have its roots in the emergence of the 
intelligence testing movement in Europe that began in the late 19th century.   
Sir Francis Galton.  Sir Francis Galton is generally credited with pioneering the 
psychological testing movement (e.g., Anastasi, 1996; Cohen & Swerdlik, 2002; Sattler, 
2001).  Following Charles Darwin’s discussion of individual differences in his 
publication of On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection (1859), Sir Francis 
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Galton developed an interest in heredity and subsequently published his book Hereditary 
Genius: An Inquiry into its Laws and Consequences (1869).  Within this text, Galton 
presented his “pioneering” views of intelligence, arguing that, “a man’s natural abilities 
are derived by inheritance, under exactly the same limitations as are the form and 
physical features of the organic world” (p. 1), and suggesting that individual and group 
differences, in several domains—particularly intelligence—are primarily attributable to 
genetics.  
As one might infer, Galton’s work can be connected to the modern-day nature vs. 
nurture debate, which influenced the development of intelligence theory in its own right, 
but he is often credited with initiating the psychological testing movement for additional 
reasons (Anastasi, 1996; Cohen & Swerdlik, 2002; Sattler, 2001). In his book, Inquiries 
into Human Faculty and its Development (1883), Galton described several techniques 
and methods he used— predominantly physical and sensory measurements— to “take 
note of the varied hereditary faculties” (p. 1) which he believed were closely connected to 
the “innate moral and intellectual faculties” of individuals and groups.  In this 
compilation of articles, he also offered some consideration for the problems involved in 
measuring mental characteristics.  Although it was Pearson who developed the product-
moment correlation technique, the roots of this concept can be linked to Galton’s work, 
and Galton is ultimately recognized as the person who developed the central statistical 
concepts of regression to the mean and the coefficient of correlation (Sattler, 2001).    
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Alfred Binet and Théodore Simon.  Although Galton is credited with initiating 
the psychological testing movement, the development of the first cognitively based 
psychological measure is attributed to French psychologists Alfred Binet and Théodore 
Simon (1905).  Binet and Simon (1895; cited in Anastasi, 1996) criticized existing 
measures of the time as being too highly specialized, too simple, and too focused on 
sensory perception, which contributed to the impetus for their development of the Binet-
Simon Scale (Binet & Simon, 1905).  As a cognitively-based measure, the Binet-Simon 
Scale included tests for memory, comprehension, attention, judgment, and reasoning, 
which to a large degree have become the basis for intelligence tests used today. In 
contrast to Galton’s hereditary view of intelligence, Binet argued that intelligence is 
influenced by a number of interrelated processes and is subject to change over time 
(Siegler, 1992).  
Henry H. Goddard and Lewis M. Terman.  Henry H. Goddard introduced the 
Binet-Simon Scales to the United States in 1908 and is credited with being the first to 
translate the scales into English, make minor revisions, and standardize it with American 
children (Goddard, 1910).  Despite the contradiction to Binet’s view of intelligence, 
Goddard argued that the scale measured intelligence as a unitary function primarily 
determined by heredity (Blum, 1978; Gould, 1981; Tuddenham, 1962).  Goddard’s work 
provided the foundation for Lewis M. Terman’s revisions to the scale.  Terman made 
extensive modifications to the scale and published it in 1916 as the Stanford Revision and 
Extension of the Binet-Simon Scale (Stanford-Binet; Terman, 1916).  Terman (1916) 
described several significant revisions made to the Binet-Simon scales, including 1) 
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lengthening the measure by including more subtests, 2) extending the upper limit of the 
scale to include the “superior adult” level, 3) incorporating Stern’s mental quotient 
(calculated by dividing mental age by chronological age; see Stern, 1914), 4) establishing 
a standard deviation of 15 to 16 points at each age level, 5) scaling the test to 
approximate a normal, bell-shaped curve, and 6) standardizing the scale with 1000 
children in California (with emphasis placed on using subjects who were “nearly as 
possible representative of the several ages… in a community of average social status” (p. 
52)).  The introduction of the Binet-Simon Scale, as well as the revisions and methods 
employed by Terman to create the Stanford-Binet launched both the intelligence testing 
movement and the clinical testing movement and stimulated the development of these 
movements around the world.  Tuddenham (1962) summarizes this influence: 
The success of the Stanford-Binet was a triumph of pragmatism, but its 
importance must not be underestimated, for it demonstrated the feasibility of 
mental measurement and led to the development of other tests for many special 
purposes. Equally important, it led to a public acceptance of testing which had 
important consequences for education and industry, for the military, and for 
society generally. (p. 494) 
Although the tone of this excerpt is generally positive, Tuddenham provides a bit of 
foreshadowing through his mention of the “important consequences” of the public 
acceptance of testing, a point which will be discussed in more depth in a later section of 
this review.      
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David Wechsler.  David Wechsler represents the next significant milestone in 
intelligence test development.  His measure, the Wechsler-Bellevue Intelligence Scale 
(Wechsler, 1939a, 1939b), did not consist of any original tests; rather, it was a synthesis 
of previously existing tests and materials that gleaned virtually immediate popularity, as 
evidenced by positive reviews published upon its release (see, e.g., Boake, 2002; Buros, 
1941, 1949; Lubin, Wallis, & Paine, 1971; Tulsky, 2003).  Following the production of 
the Wechsler-Bellevue scale, Wechsler developed more specialized instruments, 
including the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC; Wechsler, 1949), the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS; Wechsler, 1955), and the Wechsler Preschool 
and Primary Scale of Intelligence (WPPSI; Wechsler, 1967).  In the 1950’s and 1960’s, 
Wechsler’s intelligence scales surpassed the Stanford-Binet as the most widely-used 
measure of intelligence (Lubin, Wallis, & Paine, 1971), and more recent surveys indicate 
that the widespread popularity of Wechsler’s scale remains intact (eg. Archer, Maruish, 
Imhof, & Piotrowski, 1991; Camara, Nathan, & Puente, 2000; Lubin, Larsen, & 
Matarazzo, 1984; Wilson & Reschly, 1996).   
Wasserman & Tulsky (2005) attribute the popularity of the Wechsler intelligence 
scales to 1) a lack of available intellectual assessment measures for adults, 2) the “rare” 
integration of verbal and performance tests into a single battery, 3) early validity research 
conducted through the “co-norming” with other tests that were commonly used in 
practice, 4) an exceptional norming sample for the time, and 5) special emphasis on 
“psychometric rigor.” In sum, “the practice of intellectual assessment in the second half 
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of the 20th century may arguably been most strongly influenced by the work of David 
Wechsler” (1986-1981; Wasserman & Tulsky, 2005, p. 12).  
Intelligence theory.  Parallel to the intelligence testing movement came 
developments in intelligence theory and related statistical methods.  One of the 
fundamental topics in question throughout the testing movement is how to define or 
conceptualize intelligence as a construct.  This debate has already been introduced to a 
limited extent in the previous section’s discussion of Galton, Binet, and Goddard; 
however, the debate continued long after, and after over 100 years of dialogue, there is 
still no consensus regarding a definition of intelligence (e.g., Sattler, 2001; Wasserman & 
Tulsky, 2005).  A plethora of definitions of intelligence have been proposed over time, 
and with each new conceptualization, intelligence theory has evolved, and the question of 
how to measure intelligence has continued to be asked.  These issues have also risen in 
relation to issues of test bias, as the underlying theories of intelligence have often 
influenced the nature of tests as well as their application.  Over the course of time, 
statistical methods similar to those used to develop models of intelligence have also been 
used to assess bias within measures of intelligence.  The next several sections include a 
brief review of theories of intelligence contributing to the CHC theory, which underlies 
the model of intelligence used for the current study (for a more detailed review of these 
and other contributing theories, see, e.g., McGrew, 2005).   
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Charles E. Spearman: g factor.  Charles E. Spearman is credited with publishing 
one of the first attempts at formulating a theory of intelligence that was based on 
empirical foundation (Spearman, 1904).  Spearman’s research provided empirical support 
for one overarching factor of intelligence (g) and sparked controversy in the field for 
much of the 20th century.  His original two-factor theory (1904) consisted of this 
overarching g factor, which was mathematically derived and accounted for the shared 
variance across intelligence tests, and specific s factors, which accounted for specific test-
related variance.  Despite intense criticisms, Spearman’s g has been retained in most 
contemporary models of intelligence and has been described as “one of the most central 
phenomena in all of behavioral science, with broad explanatory powers” (Jensen, 1998, p. 
xii).  In addition to the contribution of his g factor, Spearman is also credited with 
pioneering the statistical method that ultimately became factor analysis, variations of 
which are still employed in intelligence research today.   
  Louis L. Thurstone: Multiple-factor models of intelligence.  More complex 
models were proposed as statistical methods become more sophisticated, with Louis L. 
Thurstone at the forefront of true factor analysis methods.  Using these more advanced 
methods, Thurstone began in the mid-1930s to provide evidence counter to Spearman’s 
general factor and to set the foundation for the multiple-factor models that characterize 
contemporary intelligence models (eg. Thurstone,1938).  However, with time and the 
development of higher-order factor analytic techniques, Thurstone eventually conceded 
to the possibility of a general g factor (Thurstone, 1947).     
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 Raymond B. Cattell and John L. Horn: Gf-Gc.   Raymond B. Cattell used factor 
analytic techniques to develop a two-factor model of intelligence (Gf-Gc theory), which 
he introduced in 1941 (Cattell, 1941).  Cattell argued that Spearman’s g was insufficient 
in explaining intelligence and that intelligence could be better explained by a two-factor 
model, comprised of a “fluid ability” or “fluid intelligence” factor (Gf) and a “crystallized 
ability” or “crystalized intelligence” factor (Gc).  John L. Horn, a student of Cattell’s, 
joined Cattell in the 1960s in research that would expand the number of ability factors 
from 2 to 5 (Horn & Cattell, 1966).  Horn later expanded the model further, proposing 
nine ability factors (e.g. Horn & Noll, 1997).  Throughout the course of their research, 
Cattell and Horn argued against a general g factor, as they maintained their early 
argument that a single general factor did not fit the data.   
 Vernon, Guilford, and Gustafsson: Intermediate models.  Three intermediate 
models were proposed between Cattell and Horn’s Gf-Gc theory and John B. Carroll’s 
Three-stratum model.  Although these three models did not have the same degree of 
impact and are not nearly as well-known as the two models preceding and following 
them, it is important to acknowledge these intermediary steps.  P. E. Vernon (1961) 
proposed a hierarchical factorial model that included a super-ordinate g factor and two 
lower-order factors, labeled “verbal-educational ability” (v:ed) and “mechanical-spatial 
ability” (k:m).  These two lower-order factors were sub-divided further into two and three 
abilities, respectively.  J.P. Guilford (1967), in his structure-of-intellect theory, rejected 
the verbal-nonverbal dichotomy, claiming that different abilities are involved when 
dealing with different kinds of information.  He proposed four categories in the “content 
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of intellect”: figural, symbolic, semantic, and behavioral.  The third and final 
intermediate model of note was proposed by G. Gustafsson (1984), in which he 
formulated an integrated hierarchical model of intelligence.  He proposed a general 
ability (g) at the highest level, with two broad factors at the next level: crystallized 
intelligence and general visualization, for verbal and figural information, respectively.  
This integrated hierarchical model is a significant precursor to later research, as 
Gustafsson and Vernon both anticipated a structure that would be integral for future 
models.   
 John B. Carroll: Three-stratum model.  Following the contributions provided by 
Vernon, Guilford, and Gustafsson discussed in the previous section, John B. Carroll 
published his seminal work in the field, Human Cognitive Abilities: A Survey of Factor 
Analytic Studies (1993) in which he described and reported findings of a comprehensive 
meta-analysis of intelligence testing data for roughly 50 years.  Through the 
implementation of thorough and systematic factor analyses, Carroll ultimately proposed a 
hierarchical, three-stratum (three level) model of intelligence.  Within this model, Carroll 
included a third-order factor of general intelligence (g), eight (or more) second-order 
factors representing broad intellectual abilities, and 65 first-order factors, representing 
narrow intellectual abilities.  Carroll’s research provided evidence that the third-order g 
factor is most related to factors of variables involving reasoning ability, which suggests 
that the g factor of Carroll’s model may be similar to (or even synonymous with) the Gf 
of Cattell and Horn’s model.   
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Cattell-Horn-Carroll: CHC theory.  CHC theory represents the integration of 
Cattell and Horn’s Gf-Gc model (Horn & Noll, 1997) and Carroll’s three-stratum model 
of intelligence (Caroll, 1993).  This theory is considered a psychometric theory, as it is 
based on statistical methods that assume that “the structure of intelligence can be 
discovered by analyzing the interrelationship of scores on mental ability tests” through 
the creation and evaluation of models via factor analysis (Davidson & Downing, 2000, p. 
37).  McGrew (2005) conducted a detailed review of the CHC literature, including 
studies intentionally investigating various aspects of the CHC model and studies in which 
the CHC model was applied via post hoc analysis, and he concludes that the literature 
collectively provides support for the “broad strokes of contemporary CHC theory” 
(McGrew, 2005, p. 149).  Moreover, McGrew indicates that, when compared to other 
popular theories of intelligence and cognitive abilities, CHC theory is the most 
comprehensive theory and has the most empirical support (2005).  In a more recent 
review, Keith and Reynolds (2010) suggest that, although not without its limitations, 
CHC theory “offers the best current description of the structure of human intelligence” 
(p. 8). As such, CHC theory has been applied extensively in the development of various 
test batteries, as well as incorporated into the interpretation of existing batteries.  
 Applications and uses.  As previously stated, the introduction of intelligence 
tests led to the widespread development and implementation of psychological testing.  
Not long after the Binet-Simon Scale was introduced, psychological tests were used in a 
wide range of settings, such as juvenile courts, reformatories, prisons, children’s homes, 
and schools (Pintner, 1931).  The Binet-Simon Scale helped “school systems identify 
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students who were likely to learn less rapidly than most of their peers and who, therefore, 
were candidates for special education” (Siegler, 1992, p. 185), which was its original 
intended purpose in France in the early 20th century.  Use of cognitive tests was also 
common outside of schools, with one early example being the US military’s 
administration of cognitive tests to all army recruits during World War I (Yerkes, 1921; 
Yoakum & Yerkes, 1920).  Additional early applications for intelligence tests included 
evaluation of immigrants at Ellis Island to determine whether they were “mentally 
deficient” and thus not eligible for entry into the United States (Goddard, 1917).  Early 
applications also included assessment of individuals in order to sort and categorize them 
for varying levels of job eligibility (i.e., unskilled labor based on measured IQ), testing of 
people believed to be “feeble-minded” in order to institutionalize them (as feeble-
mindedness, or a lack of intelligence, was associated with a lack of morality and thus 
contributed to “crime, pauperism, and industrial inefficiency”), and evaluating those 
suspected of being “morons” with the goal of preventing them from having children and 
passing on their “gene for low intelligence” (Gould, 1996).   
  Although some of these uses would now be considered unacceptable by today’s 
standards, many contemporary uses for and applications of cognitive testing are similar to 
those of earlier decades.  As previously stated, Binet’s measure was originally designed 
for the identification of students who would need special education in schools, and 
cognitive tests continue to serve this function.  In addition to identifying children who 
have learning disabilities and might need special assistance in school, cognitive measures 
are also employed in the identification of gifted children for the purposes of tailoring 
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their education as well (e.g., McIntosh & Dixon, 2005).  Classification also remains a 
broad objective of cognitive testing; however, the purposes and implications of this 
classification have changed dramatically since the early 20th century.  Dowdy, Mays, 
Kamphaus, and Reynolds (2009) identified several functions of classification that apply 
to contemporary cognitive testing, including determining eligibility for special education 
services, identifying an individual’s need for services, determining parameters (i.e., 
intensity and duration) of treatment, enhanced communication among professionals, ease 
of description, the necessity of valid taxonomies for grouping individuals for research, 
and the ability to differentiate abilities.  Additional objectives of cognitive assessment 
include treatment planning, political advocacy, program evaluation, and research 
(Keough, 1994).  In general, the administration of cognitive tests is common for a variety 
of purposes, across a wide array of settings, such as schools, clinics, hospitals, industry, 
and the military.   Intelligence testing also influences public policy, business, and 
scientific psychology (e.g., Sattler, 2001), with, as quoted earlier, “consequences for 
education, industry, the military, and society generally” (Tuddenham, 1962, p 494).  
Sattler (2001) summarizes this abundance of testing uses and applications: “The testing 
movement, although subject to criticism, continues to thrive in the United States and in 
many other parts of the world.” (p. 134).   
  Issues surrounding intelligence testing.  Up to this point, this review has 
primarily been a summary of selected topics related to cognitive testing, including the 
historical development of the intelligence testing movement, highlights of the 
development of intelligence theory, and a description of the many uses and applications 
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of intelligence tests.  Although presented in a relatively uncritical manner thus far, each 
of these areas has significant problems and criticisms relating to the issue of test bias, 
which is both a core question of the proposed study, as well as a fundamental concern in 
the domain of intelligence testing.  Many of these issues will be addressed in more depth 
later; however, this portion of the review will provide a brief transition in order to bridge 
the previous sections that broadly address intelligence testing with the following sections 
that address the more specific issue of test bias.   
The above survey of historical development in the intelligence testing movement 
provides a summary of the ideological underpinnings of the testing movement, identifies 
key figures in this process, and highlights the processes involved in launching the testing 
movement.  Several things to consider, which will be discussed in more detail in the next 
section, are the potential ways in which each of these— the ideologies, the individuals, 
and the processes— could influence test development, application, and interpretation.  
As established in the summary of intelligence theory, one of the biggest issues 
facing the field, from its inception to the present, is that there is a continued lack of 
consensus in the field regarding the definition of intelligence.  There is so little 
consensus, in fact, that Jensen (1998) suggested that psychologists, “drop the ill-fated 
word from our scientific vocabulary, or use it only in quotes, to remind ourselves that it is 
not only scientifically unsatisfactory, but wholly unnecessary” (p. 49).  Although this 
recommendation is a bit extreme, it illustrates the point that the term “intelligence” used 
as broadly and indiscriminately as it is, actually has limited value in itself.  A related 
issue pertains specifically to the psychometric definitions of intelligence, as they underlie 
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the apparently circular manner in which theory influences measurement, which in turn 
influences theory.  As Boring noted in 1923, intelligence is defined as whatever 
intelligence tests measure. This observation only becomes more relevant as models of 
intelligence are increasingly based on the data coming from intelligence tests.  
Implications for test bias are significant, especially with the reification of intelligence that 
occurs during the early 20th century (more on this will be presented in the next section).      
 Beyond the primary issue of defining intelligence is the secondary issue of the 
application, use, and interpretation of intelligence tests.  As illustrated previously, these 
applications were (and still are) extensive, spanning a wide range of functions and 
settings.  Questions of bias were raised shortly after intelligence tests began to be used.  
In fact, Binet is credited with conducting the first investigation into “cultural” bias around 
1910 (Binet & Simon, 1916/1973) and was followed shortly after by Stern (1914).  
Although one might find this surprising given the trajectory that his test ultimately 
followed, Binet offered warnings regarding the use of his measure, identifying its 
limitations and indicating that longer-term influences, such as family and school 
background, health, and past effort in school could potentially affect test performance.  In 
light of these limitations, Binet only recommended comparisons of test results among 
children from comparable backgrounds (Binet & Simon, 1916/73).  Despite Binet’s 
warnings, tests were administered to virtually anyone and everyone, often without 
consideration of the appropriateness of the measure, and frequently with important 
outcomes and decisions at stake.  
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Bias in Intelligence Testing 
 Questions of bias, particularly cultural bias, have been the source of great 
controversy since they were first raised, and they remain significant issues in 
contemporary professional literature and the popular press.  The issue of bias was raised 
for several reasons, but one of the most fundamental reasons is likely connected to the 
differences in intellectual performance across groups, particularly across racial or ethnic 
groups.  This discrepancy was established very early in the testing movement when 
Strong (1913, as cited in Valencia & Suzuki, 2001, Chapter 1) reported White-Negro 
differences on intelligence.  Although this difference was interpreted by some as 
evidence of the superiority of the White race (see discussion below), others interpreted 
this mean score difference as evidence that the tests were biased.  Problems with the a 
priori assumptions associated with this interpretation are addressed in depth by Jensen 
(1980) in his discussion of the “egalitarian fallacy”; however, the issue of test bias was 
not settled.  A number of psychologists, particularly Black and minority psychologists, 
raised objections to the use of intellectual tests with minorities (e.g., Thomas, 1982; 
Valencia, 1997).  Reynolds and Lowe (2009, p. 339-340) and Reynolds, Lowe, & Saenz 
(1999, p. 556-557) identified seven categories into which the most frequently stated 
problems fall; these categories and a summary of their descriptions are included in Table 
6 (see Reynolds & Lowe, 2009 and Reynolds, Lowe, & Saenz, 1999 for more details).  
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Table 6  
Categories and Descriptions of Most Frequently Stated Problems with the Use of 
Intelligence Tests with Ethnic Minorities 
 
Category Description 
Inappropriate content Tests and test materials are rooted in mainstream, majority culture 
and values. Racial and ethnic minorities in the US may not have been 
exposed to content in test questions or stimulus materials, which may 
result in cognitively equivalent responses that are scored as incorrect.  
Thus, scores may reflect differences in values, not ability.  
 
Inappropriate 
standardization samples 
Historically, it was not unusual for standardization samples to be all 
White, and thus racial/ethnic minorities were underrepresented in 
these samples. Contemporary standardization samples are more often 
representative based on race/ethnicity proportions in the national 
population.  
 
Examiners’ and 
language bias 
Most psychologists in the United States are White and speak only 
standard English, which may mean they are unable to accurately 
communicate with minority children—“to the point of being 
intimidating and insensitive to ethnic pronunciation of words on the 
test” (p. 339).   
 
Inequitable social 
consequences 
A long history of discrimination and being thought unable to learn 
(i.e., limited opportunity to learn) in conjunction with bias in 
educational and psychological testing may lead to ethnic and racial 
minorities being disproportionately represented in dead-end/low 
achievement educational tracks.  
 
Measurement of 
different constructs 
 
Similar to the points made in the first category, educational and 
psychological tests may measure different attributes for ethnic/racial 
minority children as compared to the majority culture, which 
negatively impacts the validity of test results.  
 
Differential predictive 
validity 
 
Measures may not accurately predict outcomes for minority group 
members, despite appearing to accurately predict outcomes for 
majority group members. Further criticisms that the way outcome 
criteria are defined (i.e., outcome criteria are inherently biased) are 
also included in this category.  
 
Qualitatively distinct 
minority and majority 
aptitude and personality 
Ethnic minority cultures and the majority culture may be so different 
as to require different conceptualizations of ability and personality, 
and thus would require separate tests for different groups.  
 
Note. Table provides summary of the categories and descriptions provided by Reynolds & Lowe 
(2009, p. 339-340) and Reynolds, Lowe, & Saenz (1999, p. 556-557). 
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One weakness identified in early objections was that they were “frequently stated 
as facts on rational rather than empirical grounds” (e.g., Reynolds & Brown, 1984, p. 17).  
However, in contrast to when the controversy began, empirical research has been 
conducted to investigate the validity of these claims.  Reviews of this literature can be 
found elsewhere (e.g. Jensen, 1980; Reynolds, 1982b), though some of this evidence will 
be incorporated into the subsequent section.  In general, the categories identified by 
Reynolds and Lowe (2009) remain relevant and capture the essence of the problems 
identified over time with regard to test bias, particularly within the domain of cultural 
bias.   
Historical precedent.  Although a detailed discussion regarding definitions of 
test bias will be presented in a later section, it is important to note at this point that in 
general, bias in intelligence testing has historically referred to cultural bias (both racially 
oriented and class oriented, see e.g., Valencia & Suzuki, 2001, Chapter 5), which will 
also be the case throughout this review of the historical precedent of bias in intelligence 
testing.  This section will acknowledge selected key ideological influences and historical 
developments that may have contributed to bias in intelligence testing, as well as describe 
specific historical events in which test bias was addressed overtly.  The content within 
this “Historical Precedent” section was obtained from numerous sources, however, the 
organization, including section headings, is similar to that used by Valencia and Suzuki 
(2001, Chapter 1).  
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 Ideology of the intelligence testing movement.  The fundamental contributions of 
measurement to the intelligence testing movement are commonly recognized (see, e.g., 
Cohen and Swerdlik, 2002; Sattler, 2001).  The impact of ideology on intelligence 
testing, however, does not receive as much attention, despite arguments that it may have 
contributed to shaping the intelligence testing movement to an equal degree as 
measurement (see, e.g., Cravens, 1978; Degler, 1991; Fass, 1980; Gould, 1981; Guthrie, 
1976; Marks, 1981; as cited in Valencia, 1997 and Valencia & Suzuki, 2001, Chapter 1).  
As the individual credited with initiating the psychological testing movement, Galton is a 
natural candidate for consideration when investigating potential sources of ideological 
influence.  As described previously in this review, much of Galton’s work in psychology 
was inspired by Darwin’s writings on natural selection, and his hereditarian perspective is 
common knowledge.  One observation that has not yet been made in this review, 
however, was the overt presence of racist views presented by Galton.  In his book 
Hereditary Genius (1869), for example, Galton included a chapter entitled, “The 
Comparative Worth of Different Races,” in which he provided a list of races ranked 
according to his observations.  He concluded that ancient Greeks were considered the 
“ablest race of whom history bears record” (p. 340).  Anglo-Saxons were slightly lower, 
with the “African negro” below the lowest Anglo-Saxon, and the “Australian type” “one 
grade below the African negro” (p.339).  Despite including only two relatively short 
chapters focused explicitly on race, a “scientific racist” perspective is clearly apparent 
(Richards, 1997).          
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Valencia and Suzuki (2001, Chapter 1) identified two primary influences of 
Galton’s biased views on the field of psychological testing,  “(a) how American 
psychologists approached the practice of testing minority children on intelligence tests 
(largely a practice of indifference to cultural and environmental differences), and (b) how 
behavioral scientists and applied psychologists attempted to explain White-minority 
group differences in intellectual performance (frequent genetic interpretations)” (p. 4-5).  
Goddard, Terman, and Yerkes, all hereditarians (and all mentioned previously in this 
review), are prime examples of the infiltration of Galton’s views into the discourse of 
psychological and intelligence testing (Gould, 1996).  Terman’s comments in his guide 
for the clinical application of the original Stanford-Binet (Measurement of Intelligence, 
1916) provide a very clear illustration of this influence.  His statements below follow a 
description of two Portuguese brothers included for the purposes of illustrating 
“borderline” intelligence (individuals with IQs between 70 and 80):  
It is interesting to note that M.P. and C.P. represent the level of intelligence 
that is very, very common among Spanish-Indian and Mexican families of the 
Southwest and also among negroes.  Their dullness seems to be racial, or at 
least inherent in the family stocks from which they come.  The fact that one 
meets this type with such extraordinary frequency among Indians, Mexicans, 
and negroes suggests quite forcibly that the whole question of racial 
differences in mental traits will have to be taken up anew and by experimental 
methods.  The writer predicts that when this is done, there will be discovered 
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enormously significant differences in general intelligence, differences that 
cannot be wiped out by any scheme of mental culture. 
Children of this group should be segregated in special classes and be given 
instruction that is concrete and practical.  They cannot master abstractions, but 
they often can be made efficient workers, able to look out for themselves.  
There is no possibility at present of convincing society that they should not be 
allowed to reproduce, although from a eugenic point of view they constitute a 
grave problem because of their unusually prolific breeding (p. 91-92, also as 
cited in Valencia & Suzuki, 2001, Chapter 1).  
The presence of racial bias in Terman’s statements is unequivocal.  Moreover, the 
presence of Galton’s ideological influence is undeniable as well.  Although specific 
implications of these views can be somewhat difficult to identify, one possible secondary 
consequence of the popularity of these views is potentially, in part, the facilitation of the 
reification of the concept of intelligence.  Although Gould (1981) attributes this 
reification primarily to Terman’s creation of the “Intelligence Quotient,” without the 
prominent hereditarian views of the time, the tendency toward viewing intelligence as a 
concrete (and completely measurable) construct may not have been so powerful.      
Because the biggest forces contributing to the momentum of the testing 
movement were (generally speaking) hereditarians, eugenicists, and often racists,  “it 
makes sense to conclude that intelligence testing—consisting of procedural, measurable, 
and social movement aspects—was a value-laden idea with significant implication for the 
stratification of schooling practices and outcomes” (Valencia & Suzuki, 2001, Chapter 1, 
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p. 7).  This evidence suggests that there has not only been at least some degree of 
ideological influence on the intelligence testing movement since its inception, but, more 
specifically, there has also been a culturally biased ideology serving as a significant 
contributor to the foundation of intelligence testing.  For a more detailed discussion of 
this ideological influence and its implications, see e.g., Valencia’s (2010) discussion of 
neohereditarianism.   
An extension of these early ideological influences can be attributed to the “race 
psychology” studies conducted during the initial stages of the testing movement.  “Race 
psychology,” a term coined by Thomas R. Garth in his research on this movement, refers 
to psychological research conducted with the objective of making comparisons among 
different races.  This field can be considered a precursor to what is presently called cross-
cultural research, though one distinction is that many of these early studies were 
conducted by researchers openly ascribing to hereditarian values and frequently 
providing hereditarian explanations for any differences identified between groups (e.g., 
Richards, 1997; Valencia, 2010).  Garth conducted two comprehensive reviews of the 
race psychology literature, one in 1925 reviewing research publications spanning 1916 to 
1924, and another in 1930 reviewing publications from 1924 to 1929 (Garth, 1925, 1930, 
as cited in Valencia & Suzuki, 2001, Chapter 1).  Although there were several domains 
examined in the studies Garth included in his reviews, one consistent trend across both 
reviews was a primary area of focus in the literature on making comparisons between 
White children and children of color with regard to their intellectual performance.  As 
Valencia and Suzuki (2001, Chapter 1) explain, in Garth’s earlier review of the literature 
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(1925), he concluded that, when considered together, the studies suggested “mental 
superiority of the white race” (p. 359), later termed the “hypothesis of racial inequality” 
(Garth, 1930, p. 348).  However, Garth’s later review of the literature suggested that the 
popularity of the “hypothesis of racial inequality” appeared to be deteriorating while a 
“hypothesis of racial equality” was garnering more support (1930).  As Valencia & 
Suzuki, 2001, Chapter 1 indicate, the majority of the studies in Garth’s 1925 review 
offered hereditarian explanations for group differences, while none of the studies in 
Garth’s 1930 review did, which suggests that there was in fact, a shift away from 
hereditarianism, or “scientific racism” (Richards, 1997).    
Heterodoxy.  Although hereditarian views were the predominant paradigm of the 
time, it is important to acknowledge that there were also researchers who deviated from 
the status quo (Valencia, 1997; Valencia, 2010).  As mentioned previously, Binet 
presented warnings regarding the limitations of his measures, though his warnings were 
largely ignored, as evidenced by the mass (mis)use of his measure.  One individual who 
was able to have a more significant impact in terms of actively opposing hereditarian 
views was a prominent researcher by the name of Otto Klineberg (Richards, 1997), who 
worked in the 1920s and 1930s to “answer, or at least to offer responses, to practically all 
existing research that proffered the position that certain groups were inferior” (Valencia, 
1997b, p. 17).  In his book, Race Differences (1935), Klineberg offered critiques of racial 
superiority theories and emphasized the need for considerations of culture in explaining 
and understanding group differences.  Additionally, Klineberg offered one of the early 
methodological critiques of testing research at the time, identifying and supporting 
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empirically geographical location, English-language abilities, and socioeconomic status 
as confounds in existing research at the time.  Klineberg thus concluded that any results 
suggesting superiority of one group over another (namely White groups over minority 
groups) were invalid, as an acceptable degree of methodological rigor was lacking.  
Thomas (1982) describes additional dissenting work, in this case contributed in 
the 1920s by Black researchers who offered strong critiques of mental testing at the time.  
Thomas organizes their work into three categories: environmental critiques, identification 
of methodological flaws or instrumentation weaknesses, and the implementation of 
independent research and the generation of additional data.  As an aside, these categories 
are somewhat similar to those of Reynolds and Brown (2009) presented earlier, although 
Thomas's categories directly incorporate empirical evidence.  Environmental critiques 
encompass environmental characteristics as explanations for differences between racial 
groups: for example, differences in educational opportunity between Whites and Blacks 
can account for racial differences in test performance (e.g., Bond, 1924, as cited in 
Thomas, 1982).  Technical criticisms of intelligence tests were quite extensive, as 
indicated, for example, by Long (1923, as cited in Thomas, 1982), who argued that tests 
of intelligence contain numerous measurement problems.  Finally, independent research 
was able to investigate alternative explanations to hereditarian conclusions, eg. Bond 
(1924, as cited in Thomas, 1982), who investigated schooling effects on mental test 
performance, and Canady (1936, as cited in Thomas, 1982), who was one of the first 
researchers to explore examiner effects on test performance across racial groups. 
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As Valencia (2001, Chapter 1) noted, there were no Mexican American scholars 
who actively criticized mental testing research until 1931, when George Isodore Sánchez 
entered the field.  Sánchez’s (1934) essay is identified by Valencia (2001, Chapter 1) as 
being one of his most significant articles, in which Sánchez provided a critique of mental 
measures and testing as they relate to Mexican American students.  Padilla and Aranda 
(1974, p. 222, as cited in, Valencia and Suzuki, 2001, Chapter 1, p.21-22) summarize the 
seven key issues raised by Sánchez: 
1) Tests are not standardized on the Spanish-speaking population of this country.  
2) Test items are not representative of the Spanish-speaking culture.  
3) The entire nature of intelligence still is a controversial issue. 
4) Test results from the Spanish-speaking continue to be accepted uncritically.  
5) Revised or translated tests are not necessarily an improvement on test 
measures.  
6) Attitudes and prejudices often determine the use of test results.  
7) The influence of testing on the educational system is phenomenal. (p. 21) 
Emergence	  of	  contemporary	  testing	  issues.	  	  In	  general,	  the	  period	  between	  1930	  and	  the	  mid-­‐1950s	  was	  characterized	  by	  maintenance	  of	  the	  status	  quo	  regarding	  test	  bias.	  	  There	  was	  a	  gradual	  decline	  in	  the	  acceptance	  of	  hereditarianism/scientific	  racism	  in	  scientific	  domains,	  though	  the	  underpinnings	  remained	  present	  in	  some	  ways	  (Richards,	  1997;	  Valencia,	  2010).	  	  Efforts	  of	  dissenters	  like	  those	  mentioned	  above	  continued	  as	  well,	  and	  the	  second	  phase	  of	  test	  bias	  controversy	  did	  not	  occur	  until	  1954,	  when	  the	  US	  Supreme	  Court	  released	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its	  decision	  for	  the	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education	  of	  Topeka	  (Valencia	  &	  Suzuki,	  2001,	  Chapter	  1).	  	  This	  decision	  struck	  down	  the	  former	  “separate	  but	  equal”	  doctrine	  of	  
Plessy	  v.	  Ferguson	  (1896)	  but	  in	  itself	  did	  not	  directly	  affect	  the	  test	  bias	  movement.	  Rather,	  the	  response	  of	  Southern	  schools	  to	  this	  ruling	  was	  ultimately	  what	  set	  the	  ball	  in	  motion.	  	  In	  their	  reluctance	  to	  integrate	  their	  schools,	  Southerners	  used	  the	  administration	  of	  intelligence	  and	  achievement	  measures	  to	  preclude	  entry	  of	  Black	  children	  into	  “white”	  schools	  (Bersoff,	  1982,	  as	  cited	  in	  Valencia	  &	  Suzuki,	  2001,	  Chapter	  1).	  	  Through	  legislation	  these	  activities	  were	  eventually	  determined	  to	  be	  unconstitutional.	  	  Interestingly	  in	  this	  case,	  only	  the	  issue	  of	  test	  use	  was	  under	  fire;	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  tests	  themselves	  was	  never	  brought	  into	  question	  (Bersoff,	  1982,	  as	  cited	  in	  Valencia	  &	  Suzuki,	  2001,	  Chapter	  1).	  	  	  	  
 With the civil rights movement highlighting the rights of racial/ethnic minorities 
at approximately the same time as this attempt to use intelligence measures to circumvent 
desegregation, there was something of a “perfect storm” that helped to rekindle the test 
bias debate (e.g., Valencia and Suzuki, 2001, Chapter 1).  Two primary features of this 
debate were the relationships between (a) curriculum differentiation (i.e., tracking) and 
group-administered intelligence tests, and (b) overrepresentation of minority students in 
special education and individually-administered intelligence tests (Valencia, 1999; 
Valencia, 2008).   
Hobson v. Hanson (1967), the first case focusing on the legality of using group-
administered intelligence tests as the sole criteria for determining curriculum placement, 
marks the beginning of a series of cases claiming that intelligence tests were being used 
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in a racially/ethnically discriminatory fashion.  Valencia and Suzuki (2001, Chapter 5; 
see also, Valencia, 2008) highlight four of these cases, (a) Diana v. State Board of 
Education (1970), (b) Covarrubias v. San Diego Unified School District (1971), (c) 
Guadalupe v. Tempe Elementary School District (1972), and (d) Larry P. v. Riles (1972, 
1979) as particularly significant due to their roles in bringing attention to the issue of 
overrepresentation of minority students in educable mentally retarded classes (Henderson 
& Valencia, 1985; Valencia, 1999; Valencia, 2008).  These four victorious cases, brought 
forth by African American, Mexican American, and American Indian plaintiffs, all 
contained arguments primarily addressing the validity of the tests themselves, as the 
plaintiffs asserted certain items were biased, rather than the use or application of the tests.  
Especially interesting is that these “analyses for bias” were based primarily on the 
subjective opinion of one or more individuals regarding whether the item at “face value” 
appeared to be biased.  As Valencia and Suzuki (2001, Chapter 5) observe, at that point 
in time, scientific investigation into test bias had not yet begun.         
In response to criticisms similar to those outlined in an earlier section (Reynolds 
& Lowe, 2009) regarding potential problems in the appropriateness of using intelligence 
measures on minorities, in conjunction with advances in statistical methods for evaluating 
test bias (see e.g., Millsap & Meredith, 2007), the mid-1970s through the 1980s were 
characterized by a surge of empirical investigations of test bias.  There has been a slight 
decline in test bias research since the beginning of the 1990s, perhaps due to conclusions 
presented by Jensen (1980) suggesting that after an “exhaustive review of the empirical 
research bearing on this issue…the currently most widely used standardized tests of 
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mental ability…are, by and large, not biased against any of the native-born English-
speaking minority groups” (p. ix).  This decline may also be associated with increased 
attention on issues of bias during measurement development and revision, as preliminary 
investigations of bias are being conducted prior to test publication.  Nonetheless, the 
importance of this research has not waned, and investigations into test bias continue.  A 
review of existing test bias literature will be presented later. 
Bias: What it is and what it is not.  The primary focus within this review up to 
this point has been relatively broad, reviewing issues related to bias from several 
perspectives, and generally melding views coming from a variety of definitions.  Within 
the literature, the best methods of defining and evaluating bias has been a source of 
persistent controversy and has been largely ignored in this review up to this point.  Thus, 
the objective of the following section is to address similar or related constructs that are 
not, technically speaking, “bias,” to discuss various definitions of test bias in the 
literature, and to clarify its definition for the purposes of the proposed study.  
Cultural loading vs. cultural bias.  As Reynolds and Brown (1984) note, the 
concepts of cultural loading and cultural bias are often (incorrectly) used interchangeably, 
even within the professional literature.  Cultural loading, they state, “refers to the degree 
of cultural specificity present in the test or in individual items of the test” (p. 23).  
Although one can assume that a greater degree of cultural loading (or a greater level of 
cultural specificity) of a test item will increase the likelihood that the item is biased 
toward individuals from outside of that culture, cultural loading does not necessitate the 
presence of cultural bias.  Cultural bias as a result of cultural loading, as implied by this 
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example, refers to a mismatch between the cultural foundations of the test and the 
cultural background or cultural exposure of the individual taking the test.  Thus, cultural 
bias does not refer to the mere presence of culture loading within a measure, although 
attempts have been made to reduce the degree of culture loading on various measures in 
order to minimize the potential for culture bias.   
One issue with attempting to reduce cultural loading on intelligence tests is the 
problem of measuring cultural loading in the first place.  Jensen (1980) suggests that 
cultural loading is often not addressed because subjective judgments (“arm chair 
analyses”) by individuals are the primary method for identifying these influences.  
However, an additional perspective that makes the evaluation of cultural loading seem 
somewhat less urgent is that all mental tests in use are culturally bound to some degree 
and may inevitably be so due to psychometric standardization methods (e.g., Harrington, 
1975; 1976; 1984).  Although this is sometimes viewed as a major flaw or weakness of 
intellectual assessment measures, the opposite, a “culture blind” test, cannot “be expected 
to predict intelligent behavior within a cultural setting” (Reynolds & Brown, 1984, p. 23).  
Thus, given that all intelligence measures are necessarily developed within a culture, the 
generalizability of those measures to other cultures or subcultures must be investigated 
empirically.  
Primary selection models and test fairness.  Academic debates within the 
literature have produced a number of models through which test bias can be understood 
(eg. Cleary, Humphreys, Kendrick, & Wesman, 1975; Darlington, 1971; Reynolds & 
Brown, 1984; Thorndike, 1971; Van de Vijver and Leung, 1997a,b; Van de Vijver and 
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Poortinga, 1997; Van de Vijver and Tanzer, 2004).  One such model is the primary 
selection model, which as a whole tends to focus on the decision-making system 
associated with assessment, rather than the test itself.  The choice of which decision-
making system to employ is largely a societal issue, as it is a heavily value- and goal-
driven issue (e.g., Reynolds & Brown, 1984; Reynolds & Lowe, 2009).  Nichols (1978) 
elaborates on this idea, suggesting that in order to choose a model for use in selection, the 
ultimate goal—whether for equality of opportunity, equality of outcome, or 
representative equality— must first be established.  Despite the merits of discussing these 
issues, these questions reach beyond the scope of this review.  
The question of test fairness is similar to that regarding primary selection models, 
in that the question that arises is one that goes beyond the scope of the measure itself; test 
fairness, like various selection models, is a function of the application or interpretation of 
a test, as opposed to a function of the test itself.  Some argue that this perspective 
supports a clear distinction between test fairness (a subjective value judgment) and test 
bias (conceptualized as being objective and technical), making test fairness and its 
opposite, test unfairness, “belong more to moral philosophy than to psychometrics” 
(Jensen, 1980, p. 49).  Jensen comments further:  
Unbiased tests can be used unfairly and biased tests can be used fairly.  Therefore, 
the concepts of bias and unfairness should be kept distinct… [A] number of 
different, and often mutually contradictory, criteria of fairness have been 
proposed, and no amount of statistical or psychometric reasoning per se can 
possibly settle any arguments as to which is best. (p. 375-376)    
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Although Jensen (1980) conceptualizes these issues as completely separate, others argue 
that test bias and test fairness are linked to varying degrees (e.g., Cole & Moss, 1989; 
Hilliard, 1984; Mercer, 1984).  In either case, one necessary prerequisite for appropriate 
application and interpretation of intelligence tests (both in the interest of test fairness and 
an accepted selection model) is to employ measures that possess equal psychometric 
reliability and validity for all groups concerned (Reynolds & Brown, 1984; Reynolds & 
Lowe, 2009).    
Test bias: Defined.  Based on the preceding discussion of selection models, test 
fairness, and cultural loading, three primary conclusions can be drawn: 1) because 
intelligence tests are inherently culture-bound, generalizability of these measures to other 
cultures and subcultures must be investigated empirically, 2) test bias must refer to 
characteristics of the test itself, rather than the application or interpretation of the 
measure, and 3) measures of intelligence must possess equal psychometric reliability and 
validity for all (relevant) groups (Brown, Reynolds, & Whitaker, 1999).   In considering 
these conclusions as criteria for defining test bias, a definition of test bias naturally 
ensues: “ systematic error in the estimation of some “true” value for a group of 
individuals” (Reynolds & Lowe, 2009).  
This definition of test bias— “the systematic (not random) error of some true 
value of test scores that are connected to group membership” (Valencia & Suzuki, 2001, 
Chapter 5, p. 115)—is consistent with the psychometric view of test bias and can be 
investigated empirically.  As a psychometric definition by nature, this explanation of test 
bias is a statistical definition “that does not concern itself with culture loading, labeling 
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effects, or test use or fairness” (Reynolds & Lowe, 2009, p. 345), exists independently of 
any test, and, like many definitions of test bias, is closely linked to test validity.  It is 
important to recognize that there are other possible definitions for test bias (as mentioned 
at the beginning of the “Primary Selection Models and Test Fairness” section of this 
review; see also Reynolds and Lowe, 2009 for a more detailed discussion/review); 
however, none of these alternatives meets all of the aforementioned criteria, and thus the 
above definition of test bias will be assumed for the remainder of this review and was 
used for the purposes of the current study.  
Relationship between test bias and validity.  As noted above and corroborated by 
Cole and Moss (1989), “many definitions of bias [e.g., Reynolds, 1982b, Shepard, 1981, 
1982] have been closely tied to validity theory” (p. 205); moreover, empirical research 
investigating test bias often applies a paradigm of validity, either a traditional “tripartite 
conceptualization”—of content, construct, and predictive or criterion-related validity—or 
a “dyadic conceptualization”—of internal and external validity (e.g., Messick, 1980, 
1981; Reynolds & Brown, 1984; Van de Vijver, & Tanzer, 2004).  This conceptualization 
of test validity as a “unitary” construct has achieved support by a number of measurement 
experts (e.g., Cole & Moss, 1989; Cronbach, 1980; Messick, 1981, 1989), though there 
are some limitations to the tripartite model.   
One such limitation is the problem of oversimplification (e.g., Messick, 1980), as 
it often leads to the incorrect assumption that establishing one type of validity indicates 
that a test is “valid” (or unbiased) overall.  In short, no one type of validity is sufficient to 
establish a lack of test bias.  In light of this, Reynolds and Brown (1984) suggested that a 
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scientific model of validity would “almost certainly have as one of its requirements the 
hierarchical arrangement of the subsets of validity” (p. 22), with content validity 
established before construct validity, and construct validity established before predictive 
validity.  That being said, there is some agreement that construct validity is the unifying 
concept of test validity (Reynolds & Brown, 1984), as “all validity is at its base some 
form of construct validity” (Guion, 1977, p. 410) due to its ability to integrate “criterion 
and content considerations into a common framework for testing rational hypotheses 
about theoretically relevant relationships” (Messick, 1980, p. 1015).   
Although validity and test bias are obviously connected, an important distinction 
to make between the two is that bias involves comparison between two (or more) groups, 
while validity can apply to only one group (Jensen, 1980).  This observation is especially 
relevant when considering the “test bias” definitions of each type of validity (in a 
subsequent section), as empirical test bias can apply to any type of group (i.e. groups 
based on race/ethnicity, sex, socioeconomic status, etc.).  Generally, however, when one 
is comparing ethnic or racial groups it is referred to as cultural bias (eg. Valencia & 
Suzuki, 2001, Chapter 5).  Furthermore, when comparing ethnic or racial groups, the 
comparison is typically between two groups, often with one identified as the “major” 
group and the other labeled as the “minor” group.  Jensen (1980) clarifies these 
distinctions, as they are not indicative of value judgments:  
The major group can usually be thought of as (1) the larger of the two groups in 
the total population, (2) the group on which the test was primarily standardized, or 
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(3) the group with the higher mean score on the test, assuming the major and 
minor groups differ in means (p. 376).     
Valencia and Suzuki (2001, Chapter 5) add an additional distinction: “The major group is 
the group that the test is believed not to be biased against” (p. 117).   
The next sections will address (to a limited extent) the manner in which these 
comparisons are made by presenting “test bias” definitions of the specified types of 
validity, followed by a brief description of some of the more popular methods used to test 
for the specified type of bias.  Some strengths and weaknesses of each method are also 
included.  For the purposes of organization, the tripartite conceptualization of validity 
will be used, as this method is consistent with other reviews (e.g., Reynolds & Lowe, 
2009). More detailed reviews can be found elsewhere (e.g., Camilli & Shepard, 1994; 
Jensen, 1980; Reynolds, 1982b, 1995, 2000; Reynolds & Brown, 1984).  
Content bias.  Test bias in terms of content validity has been empirically defined 
with a testable definition by Reynolds (1982a): 
An item or subscale of a test is considered to be biased in content when it is 
demonstrated to be relatively more difficult for members of one group than 
another when the general ability level of the groups being compared in held 
constant and no reasonable theoretical rationale exists to explain group 
differences on the item (or subscale) in question. (p. 188) 
Common methods employed to identify cultural bias at the item level include the 
following:   
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Analysis of variance (ANOVA), a popular method for identifying cultural bias—
the most popular, in fact, until the late 1980s (Camilli & Shepard, 1987)—is used to 
evaluate whether a significant group by item interaction exists, which would suggest that 
item difficulty is not uniform across groups (Reynolds & Lowe, 2009).  Camilli and 
Shepard (1994) evaluated this method, and based on significant limitations, concluded 
that it should not be used to detect cultural bias at the item level.  Item response theory 
(IRT), intended to determine differential item functioning across groups, was the 
foundation of the replacement methodology recommended by Camilli and Shepard 
(1994) after thorough analysis and their rejection of ANOVA methods.  The partial 
correlation method, developed independently by Stricker (1982) and Reynolds, Wilson, 
and Chatman (1985), assesses group differences by determining the amount of variation 
in the observed scores not due to the total score.  Although not as popular as IRT, partial 
correlation procedures have been used frequently (Jensen, 1980) and have been shown to 
effectively detect cultural bias at the item level (Reynolds, Lowe, & Saenz, 1999).  
Finally, expert approaches, in which expert reviewers assess items for content bias, are 
often used during test development (e.g., Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004a, 2004b; Elliott, 
2007).  Significant weaknesses in this method have been identified, as empirical studies 
did not support the ability of expert reviewers to predict differential item functioning 
(Camilli & Shepard, 1994; Reynolds, 2000).         
Construct bias.  Reynolds (1982a) provided the following definition of construct 
bias in terms of construct validity:   
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Bias exists in regard to construct validity when a test is shown to measure 
different hypothetical traits (psychological constructs) for one group than another 
or to measure the same trait but with different degrees of accuracy. (p. 194) 
By nature, the evaluation of measures for construct bias requires research from a variety 
of viewpoints with a range of methodologies (Reynolds, 1982a).  Thus, several methods 
have been employed to examine tests for potential construct bias.   
 Factor analytic methods qualify as one of the most popular types of empirical 
approaches to investigating construct bias (Anastasi, 1996; Cronbach, 1990; Millsap, 
2011).  These methods allow investigators to determine patterns of interrelationships of 
performance across groups.  In general, exploratory factor analysis methods are typically 
more useful in the application of tests to diagnosis, while confirmatory factor analysis 
techniques tend to be employed more in the case of hypothesis-testing research.  
Although there is some debate regarding whether these methods capture the innateness of 
the abilities measured, there is general agreement that consistent results across groups 
provide robust evidence that the construct measured by the test is a) measured in the 
same way for both groups, and b) actually the same construct for each group (Reynolds & 
Lowe, 2009).   
 Reliability methods are another group of techniques that can be used to assess 
construct bias.  These methods include internal consistency reliability, test-retest 
reliability, and alternate forms reliability (e.g., Kane, 2006).   Internal consistency 
reliability estimates— representing “the degree to which the items on a scale or subscale 
are all measuring a similar construct” (Reynolds & Lowe, 2009, p. 356)— should be 
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approximately equal across groups to demonstrate a lack of bias in construct validity.  
Like internal consistency estimates, test-retest correlations across groups should be 
similar to indicate a lack of bias in construct validity.  Differences between groups on 
test-retest correlations does not necessarily indicate bias, however, as these differences 
can also be a result of practice effects or instability in the trait measured.  Alternate forms 
reliability is primarily used in less common cases in which coefficient alpha or Kuder-
Richardson 20 (frequently used measures of internal reliability) are not appropriate or not 
possible to compute (Reynolds & Lowe, 2009).         
Predictive bias. The third and final component of the tripartite conceptualization 
of validity, predictive bias, is defined by Cleary, Humphreys, Kendrick, & Wesman 
(1975):   
A test is considered biased with respect to predictive validity when the inference 
drawn from the test score is not made with the smallest feasible random error or if 
there is constant error in an inference or prediction as a function of membership in 
a particular group. (p. 201) 
This definition of predictive bias is considered a “regression definition” and is thus best 
assessed using simple regression.  Bias in prediction using regression is determined to be 
absent when the regression equation is the same across groups.  Significant differences in 
the slope or intercept across groups will result in biased prediction if a regression 
equation for the combined groups is used.  Several methods are also available for 
situations in which multiple predictors and/or multiple criterion variables are involved 
(Reynolds & Lowe, 2009).  Path analysis was proposed by Keith and Reynolds (1990) as 
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an alternative method for evaluating bias in predictive validity. Via this method, 
consideration of the degree to which errors of measurement in testing of ability correlate 
with group membership is used to determine whether there is evidence of predictive bias.  
It should be noted, however, that although predictive bias is above content and construct 
in the hierarchical framework, an absence of predictive bias does not necessarily imply 
that there is an absence of measurement bias (Wicherts & Millsap, 2009) 
Existing test bias research.  Several authors have conducted extensive reviews 
of the test bias literature (see, e.g., Jensen, 1980; Reynolds & Lowe, 2009; Valencia & 
Suzuki, 2001, Chapter 5); however, the most recent, systematic, and detailed review was 
that conducted by Valencia and Suzuki (2001, Chapter 5).  This review is intended to 
build on theirs.  Thus, a brief summary of their findings is provided, followed by an 
updated review of research conducted since the publication of their work.  
Using frequency data collected from each of the studies reviewed, Valencia and 
Suzuki were able to make several astute and significant observations regarding the 
cultural bias research to date.  One overarching pattern they identified among the studies 
reviewed is that identification of cultural bias appeared to be “psychometric specific.” 
More precisely, studies investigating predictive bias tended to find more evidence of 
cultural bias, whereas those studies investigating construct bias (and reliability) tended to 
find very little evidence of cultural bias.  These findings indicate the potential for 
confounds relating to the methodologies for investigating the various types of validity 
bias, or perhaps relating to the definitions used for conceptualizing bias.  Via their 
review, Valencia and Suzuki identified a number of weaknesses in cultural bias research.  
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These limitations included, (a) a lack of research investigating the potential for bias in 
minority groups other than Black and Hispanic, (b) limited geographical representation of 
the United States (only 12 of the 50 states were represented), (c) potential problems with 
external validity, due to the primary representation within the research of children in 
general education, while most of the children being tested with the measures in question 
have been referred for special education, and (d) failure to control for socioeconomic 
status, language dominance, and/or sex in most studies.    
 In an effort to provide an updated review of the literature the procedures reported 
by Valencia and Suzuki were employed, with the result being that only five studies 
conducted since 1999 met their criteria for inclusion (as compared to the 62 studies 
identified in their 2001 review).  The review of these studies follows a format similar to 
that of Valencia and Suzuki, again, for the sake of consistency and ease of comparison. 
Table 7 includes descriptive data about these studies that is similar to the types of data 
provided in Valencia and Suzuki’s original review.  	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Table 7   
Characteristics of Cultural Bias Research Since 1999 
# Authors Year Type of 
Validity 
Measure Minor Group 
Participants 
Finding 
1 Keith, Quirk, 
Schartzer, & Elliott 
1999 Construct  Differential Ability Scales Black; Hispanic Non-bias 
2 Floyd, Gatheroal, & 
Roid 
2004 Content  Merill-Palmer Scale, Tryout 
Edition 
Black; Hispanic Non-bias 
3 Edwards & Oakland 2006 Construct Woodcock-Johnson-III Black Non-bias 
4 Qi & Marley 2009 Content Preschool Language Scale-4 Hispanic Non-bias 
5 Konold & Canivez 2010 Predictive Wechsler Intelligence Scale for 
Children-IV; Wechsler 
Individual Achievement Test-II 
Black; Hispanic Non-bias 
 
Results: Study characteristics. Year of study. In consideration of the year of 
study, one can observe that there tends to be a slightly heavier loading of studies (3) 
during the second half of the 2000s than in the earlier 2000s (1) or late 1990s (1).  This 
observation may be an optimistic indicator of renewed interest in conducting 
investigations of cultural bias in intelligence measures. A second possibility is that the 
trend coincides with the development and release of new editions of tests, in which case 
there should be some acknowledgment of the associated test bias research; however, it is 
doubtful that these five studies sufficiently examine all new and updated versions of 
cognitive measures published since 1999.   
Psychometric property examined. The distribution of psychometric properties 
studied is somewhat skewed, as content and construct validity were both explored in two 
studies each, whereas predictive validity was investigated once, and assessing bias 
through reliability methods was not employed at all.  The lack of reliability research in 
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the cultural bias domain may possibly be accounted for by the limited conclusions 
regarding test bias that can be drawn through this type of investigation.  An alternative 
explanation may also be that test reliability is frequently a focus during test development, 
and many published measures may already have established sound reliability across 
groups.  
Intelligence test examined. Three of the five studies explored bias in fairly well-
known, batteries for school-age children (and older, in some cases), including the 
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-IV, the Woodcock-Johnson-III Test of 
Cognitive Abilities, and the Differential Ability Scales.  The other two measures are 
designed for younger children, with the Preschool Language Scale-4 used for children 3-
5 years old and the Merrill-Palmer Scale for children ages 18 months to 4 years.  
Race/Ethnicity of minor group.  All five studies were limited to comparisons with 
Black, Hispanic, or both with regard to the race/ethnicity of the minor group.  This trend 
is consistent with both expectations and limitations recognized by Valencia and Suzuki 
(2001, Chapter 5), as these two groups are the largest minority groups in the United 
States, but other minority populations (e.g., Native Americans and Asian Americans) 
continue to be underrepresented in test bias research.   
Number of participants. The total number of participants across all five studies 
appears to have been 5,737 children.  Of these, 3,278 (57.1%) were major group children 
and 2,459  (43.0%) were minor group children (1165- 20.3%-Hispanic; 1294- 22.5%-
Black).  Similar to the pattern observed by Valencia and Suzuki (2001, Chapter 5), there 
was considerable variability in sample size across studies, with the smallest study 
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including 295 total participants and the largest having almost 2,400 total participants. 
Overall, it appears that sample sizes used for the analyses appear to have been of 
sufficient size to provide adequate power for the associated statistical analyses.  
Remaining characteristics.  Additional characteristics discussed by Valencia and 
Suzuki included gender, age, socioeconomic status (SES), language status, and education 
status.  Three of the 5 studies reported data on sex for the total sample, with one study 
providing additional data regarding sex across major and minor groups.  Four of the 5 
studies reported the age of participants in some form, with the fifth study reporting grade 
level (K-12). The range of ages across these studies is quite broad, spanning from 34 
months to 17 years, 11 months, and only two studies conducted any form of comparison 
across age groups.  Regarding SES, two studies reported having “representative” 
samples, but neither specifically mentioned SES as one of the criteria used for 
determining “representative”. One study reported a sample comprised entirely of “low-
income” participants, and though the specific criteria for this label was not disclosed, all 
participants were enrolled in a Head Start program, which are designed for economically 
disadvantaged populations. Two studies reported categorical breakdowns of SES based 
on parent education level.  Only one study reported education status of participants, as the 
authors clarified that children participating the study did not have individual education 
plans outside of their speech and language impairments.  This same study was the only 
investigation conducted with data collected outside of a standardization/norming sample 
and the only study that reported language dominance of children (monolingual English).   
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Results: Test bias.  Content bias. Studies 2 and 4 conducted investigations into 
content bias, with both investigations using differential item functioning methods to 
identify items with potential bias.  Both studies identified 2-4 questionable items, though 
the authors concluded that their investigations did not identify large-scale (significant) 
systematic item bias against either the minor or major group.   
Specifically, the authors of Study 2 identified two items (of 320 total items) as 
being differentially more difficult for one group and with a large effect size. One item 
(for 3-year-olds) suggested a longer completion time by White children as compared to 
Black children, and the other item (for 4-year-olds) which more Hispanic children were 
able to correctly complete as compared to White children. It should be noted that the 
measure used for Study 2 was a tryout edition, and at the time of publication of the 
article, it was unknown whether the items identified would remain on the final published 
version of the measure.   
Study 4 used a MANOVA to compare group means on subscales and the total 
scale initially, which indicated that their sample performed statistically lower than the 
national norms and that there were no mean differences between groups on any subscale 
or total scale across White and Hispanic groups.  Item level analyses identified four items 
with differential functioning, with two items identified as more difficult for Hispanic 
children, one item more difficult for White children, and one item with non-uniform 
differential functioning. The authors conducted an “arm-chair” content analysis of these 
items but were unable to identify an explanation and thus concluded that although these 
items may show differential functioning, they are not necessarily biased.   
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Construct bias. Studies 1 and 3 investigated construct bias.  Study 1 conducted 
multi-group confirmatory factor analysis to assess measurement invariance; whereas 
study 3 conducted principal factor analysis, multiple-group structural equation modeling, 
rc analysis, and convergent validity analysis.  Conclusions for both studies were generally 
in support of a lack of bias across groups; however, it appears that Study 1 reported 
stronger results in support of a lack of bias.   
Specifically, Study 1 reported strong support for the construct validity of the 
measure under scrutiny (the Differential Ability Scales: DAS); however, the findings 
regarding construct bias showed some variability across ethnic groups depending on age.  
For youth ages 2 to 3 ½ and ages 12 to 17, there appeared to be no evidence of construct 
bias, but for children ages 3 ½ to 5 and 6 to 11, results suggested that the test may 
measure different constructs across ethnic groups.  It should be noted, however, that the 
authors investigated these apparent differences further and suggest that the differences 
identified across groups are due to variability in the unique and error variances of the 
subtests, which are expected to vary across groups, rather than differences in the 
constructs measured across groups. Thus, the authors suggest that the evidence supports 
the conclusion of a lack of construct bias on the measure.  
Study 3 suggested that the measure under consideration (the Woodcock-Johnson, 
3rd edition: WJ-III) has a factor structure that is consistent across Black and White groups 
and does not display evidence of bias across these two groups. Limitations of Study 3 
included the use of only one score for each of the seven cognitive abilities in the analysis 
(using two scores would likely improve the reliability of the results), and the analyzing of 
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correlations to determine the probability that differences in correlations were significant 
(as this method does not take into account possible differences in variable and factor 
variances).  Thus, the authors of Study 3 concluded that factorial invariance was 
established, but in this case does not necessarily preclude the presence of group 
differences in performance on the measure that may affect test interpretation.   
Predictive bias. Study 5 investigated criterion-related bias (or differential 
prediction bias) of scores across race, gender, and parent education level.  Concurrent 
criterion-related correlations between the measures were large and statistically significant 
across all groups.  Moderately large to large coefficients were observed when the total 
sample was considered and across subgroups according to race/ethnicity, gender, and 
parent education. Differential relationships were observed for five of the 30 total 
comparisons, but none were observed across race/ethnic groups or gender for the WIAT-
II and WISC-IV FSIQ scores.  Effect sizes for statistically significant differential 
relationships were all small, and the authors indicated that the few differences observed 
are of limited clinical importance.  One strength of this study is that the authors 
investigated additional variables beyond major and minor group comparisons.  
Although the distribution of bias and non-bias findings do not appear to be 
“psychometric specific” like they were in Valencia and Suzuki’s review (2001, Chapter 
5), the small number of studies precludes the proposal of any potential alternative 
conclusions. These five studies were generally consistent with Valencia and Suzuki’s 
(2001, Chapter 5) findings, however, with regard to the paucity of rigorous research 
characterizing more recent decades.  As Valencia and Suzuki observe, research 
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investigating test bias appears to be on the decline, particularly when one compares the 
number of studies conducted in the 1970s and 1980s to the number conducted in the 
1990s forward.  This observation is consistent with the current state of the literature, as 
the 1970s produced 24 studies, the 1980s produced 33, the 1990s produced 6, and the 
2000s produced only 4.  Although it seems unlikely based on the recent trend, perhaps 
the 2010s will experience a resurgence of culture bias research.  Despite the recent 
decline in the popularity of this type of research, the importance to “press on” has not 
waned (Suzuki & Valencia, 1997). 
Valencia and Suzuki identified cultural bias investigations for fourteen different 
intelligence measures, many of which have since been revised once (e.g. Elliott, 2007; 
Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004) or in some cases twice (e.g., Wechsler, 1991, 2003; 
Woodcock & Johnson, 1989; Woodcock, McGrew, & Mather, 2001). Most of these 
updated and current measures have not been evaluated for the presence of cultural bias.  
Given that intelligence tests are (a) among the most popular measures that psychologists 
administer (Stinnett, Havey, & Oehler-Stinnett, 1994; Wilson & Reschly, 1996); (b) used 
for purposes as diverse as determining eligibility for special education services, 
identification of an individual’s need for services, determination of parameters (i.e. 
intensity and duration) of treatment (Dowdy, Mays, Kamphaus, & Reynolds, 2009), 
political advocacy, program evaluation, and research (Keough, 1994); and (c) likely to be 
administered with increasing frequency to diverse populations as globalization redefines 
boundaries of the world and the demographics within the United States evolve, the 
importance of evaluating measures for cultural bias cannot be emphasized enough. 
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